Whimsical Bodies: Agency and Playfulness in Robotic Art by Pullen, Treva
Whimsical Bodies: Agency and Playfulness in Robotic Art
by
Treva Michelle Pullen
A thesis paper presented to OCAD University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
in
Contemporary Art, Design and New Media Art Histories
Toronto, Ontario, Canada, April 2016
© Treva Michelle Pullen 2016
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the 
thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners. 
I authorize OCAD University to lend this thesis to other institutions or individuals 
for the purpose of scholarly research. 
I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public. 
I further authorize OCAD University to reproduce this thesis by photocopying or 
by other means, in total or in part, at the request of other institutions or individuals 
for the purpose of scholarly research. 
ii




Contemporary Art, Design and New Media Art Histories
2016
Abstract
! This thesis examines issues related to agency, playfulness, and behavioral 
design in robotic art. Using the term ‘whimsical bodies’ (inspired by artist Steve 
Daniels’, Whimsy, 2008) as an evocative metaphor for the playful ecology and 
creations of robotic art, I take up historical and contemporary case studies as entry 
points to a multi-faceted discussion of human-machine engagements considering 
the lenses of philosophical, art historical and curatorial methodological research. 
Robotic art’s whimsical bodies are also explored through references to new media 
scholarship, object-oriented-philosophy, metaphysics and speculative theory. In 
assessing characteristic features of the art form, such as its playfulness, use of 
humor, and critique/reconfiguration of wonder as a mode of critical engagement, 
this thesis aims to move robotic art from the periphery to the center of new media 
art as a lively and unique field of research.
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Whimsical Bodies: 
Agency and Playfulness in Robotic Art
 
! When they choose to take material form they will resemble
! Dragonflies, not machines. Their wings will shimmer.
! Like the chorus of Greek drama they will speak
! As many, but in the first person singular.
! Their colors in the sky will canopy the surface of the earth.
! In varying unison and diapason they will dance the forgotten.
! Their judgment in its pure accuracy will resemble grace and in
! Their circuits the one form of action will be understanding.
! Their exquisite sensors will comprehend our very dust




! Robotic art is playful, witty, and whimsical. The bodies that it brings to 
bear shimmer with evocative potential. They teeter on the balance of mechanical/
technological mastery and the fleshy liveliness of biological creatures. They 
perform. They are theatrical and engaging and call to us to interact. They can 
resemble organisms in their self-regulating, autopoietic existence. Where can we 
find these capricious creatures? Perhaps at a contemporary art gallery, located on 
the fringe of fringes as marginalized bodies within the new media field. Although 
there is much to be written about robotic art, which has been an under-explored 
field of study so far, the focus of this text will be on the questions of agency and 
playfulness, as they present a vivid entry point into characterizing this quirky art 
form. In order to help the reader to think through these questions, I’ll be using the 
1 Pinsky, Robert. “The Robots.” The New Yorker 21 Dec. 2015. Web.
phrase “whimsical bodies” to refer to both the specific works invoked in this 
thesis and the type of embodiment they point to in the broader ecology of the art. 
The phrase draws its origins from the lively, behavioral, playful qualities 
expressed by robotic creatures, as encapsulated by the work of Toronto-based 
artist Steve Daniels, specifically Whimsy, 2008, a set of eight behaving bots 
“developed to explore simple behavioral rule systems in an embodied 
context” (“Spinning the Web”). These beings connote the active, odd, fanciful, 
humorous, behavioral qualities of robotics that often seem to characterize the 
medium and modes of production presented throughout the history of the field.  
! Whimsical objects, pointing to a blurring of ontological categories in 
Daniels’s work, are playful, mischievous, and quizzical things that seem to evade 
our full understanding or cognition. Whimsicality is a state of being or quality that 
is hard to describe, and perhaps this is part of its appeal, at least to the human 
mind. Whimsical objects are odd, unusual, and perhaps even fantastical.
! What is robotic art? Wading through the multitude of definitions for the 
term robot there seems to be repeated references to a behavioral essence. They are 
mechanical (or virtual) artificial agents; actors that are constructed of 
technological and mechanical components that can behave in the absence of a 
biological body. Looking back in history, we find accounts of fantastical, 
synthetic-yet-seemingly-living creatures in various mythological traditions. 
Contemporary artist and professor of Art and Technology Studies Eduardo Kac 
draws our attention to a number of these myths, such as “the Greek story of 
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Galatea - a statue brought to life by the goddess Aphrodite - or the Jewish legend 
of the Golem, a speechless anthropoid made of clay by humans” (Kac 2001; 76). 
Kac also identifies a number of more recent narratives in literature, such as Mary 
Shelly’s Frankenstein (1818), Karel Capek’s robots in R.U.R. (1922), Robert 
Heinlein’s Waldo (1940), and Isaac Asimov’s Cutie (1941) (Kac 2001). Cinema 
has its own share of (mis)behaving robotic creatures, populating such iconic films 
as George Lucas’ Star Wars (1977), Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982), Paul 
Verhoeven’s RoboCop (1987) and José Padilha’s 2014 reboot, Steven Spielberg’s 
A.I. Artificial Intelligence (2001), Alex Proyas’ I, Robot (2004), Andrew Stanton’s 
WALL-E (2008), Neil Blomkamp’s Chappie (2015) and Alex Garland’s Ex 
Machina (2015) to name a few. In regards to the production of actual functional 
robots (as found in scientific research) the first commercially available bots 
appeared in the early 1960s in the United States and were programmed to perform 
a specific task (or tasks) in industrial production and manufacturing (Kac 2001). 
Robotics entered the art world shortly after with the development of the non-profit 
arts and engineering organization E.A.T. (Experiments in Art and Technology) 
founded in 1967. I will provide a more extensive historical review of robotic art in 
Chapter 1 but a little more contextualization might be useful before that. 
! Robots are interactive and communicative (Kac 2001). They often prompt 
reciprocal relationships between machines and humans (such as Norman White’s 
Helpless Robot, 1987-96, Edward Ihnatowicz’s The Senster, 1969-70, Jim Pallas’ 
Nose Wazoo, 1990; all of such I will expand upon in the following chapter). The 
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robot is a designed object that is powered by its technological components and 
programming. Its actions and experiences are computationally controlled. Most 
generally, robots function based upon electronic programing; they processes data 
by virtue of a sensual reading of their environment (for example, light sensors 
triggering a programmed response) and operate autonomously to some degree. 
They are mobile in some form or other and they exhibit behaviors that may be 
understood as intelligent. Robotic art does not stray away from these categories. 
What it does do is expand upon the lively nature of robotics to create social, 
engaging, playful, and agentic creatures that are able to comment on the culturally 
coded understandings of the organic-synthetic divide.
! The aim of this thesis is to contextualize (and distinguish) this type of 
playful, evocative and whimsical art within the canon of new media art. 
‘Whimsy’ (as a characteristic that encompasses robotic art’s behavioral qualities – 
liveliness, cuteness, and evocations of humor, magic and trickery, [which I will 
explore in the subsequent chapters]) as well as play (as an activity performed for 
pleasure or enjoyment) – are oft dismissed as superficial and thus potentially less 
deserving of the criticality of scholarship or canonization within the field. Though 
scholarship may be less visible in the field (due to the marginalization of new 
media and electronic media arts writing and scholarship in the larger discourse of 
art criticism - specifically the fact that such scholarship, as it does exist, is often 
hidden in the recesses of the larger art historical canon), robotic art remains a 
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vehicle to enter into a critical discourse around the lively, humorous and tricky 
nature oft present in media art production. 
! This research has been born out of a fascination with lively new media art, 
as well as my own bias towards the enchanting liveliness of robotic creatures (that 
may point to the hidden ontologies of nonhumans). This bias often plays out in 
my own desire to evaluate and interpret lively robotic beings as sentient to some 
degree. Perhaps it is their lively and whimsical qualities that gesture towards this 
reading and, for me, make such objects so compelling. 
! Initially I was introduced to the works of Toronto-based artists (all of 
whom are/were OCAD U present and past faculty members and students) Doug 
Back, Judith Doyle, Kate Hartman, Layne Hinton, Michael Page and Norman 
White due to a collaborative curatorial project culminating in an exhibition titled 
Influenc(Ed.) Machines, 2014. As a co-curator of the exhibition I became 
enthralled with the audience experiences of the work. The exhibition, inspired by 
curator and media art historian Caroline Langill’s research into the burgeoning 
new media scene of Toronto and the liveliness of machinic objects, created an 
atmosphere that enchanted, tricked, played with, and haunted the spectator. My 
research for the project emerged out of an interest in the Toronto art scene of the 
1970s, more specifically centered around OCA (Ontario College of Art) and the 
development of a curriculum focused on the production of technologically based 
work at the hands of British cybernetic artist and then president Roy Ascott. 
Ascott’s short tenure as OCA’s president from 1971-1972 marked a radical change 
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in the pedagogy and structures of the institution. Though many of his changes 
were amended shortly after Ascott left the institution, the interest in new media 
technologies and its advocating faculty members such as Canadian electronic 
media artist Norman White remained. Influenc(Ed.) Machines, inspired by the 
radical changes at OCA in the 1970s and the adoption of technological methods in 
institutional artistic production, created a site for interactivity and reciprocal, 
playful engagements between humans and machines. The whimsical ecology of 
the exhibition inspired my further probing into the experiential and theoretical 
underpinning of such work as a method of engaging with and understanding the 
liveliness of new media art. 
! The questions that developed from this research and curatorial-based 
inquiry into the liveliness of new media objects were plentiful, although my main 
focus remained on their potential for engagement - perhaps stemming from my 
background as a curator. An issue related to this potential was the robotic art 
objects’ capacity for action, raising questions about intentionality. Notably, the 
possibility of robotic art having agentic capacities - with robots acting upon and 
interacting with the spectator - presented a problem for gallery viewership as it 
challenged traditional viewership protocols inhibiting touching, moving with, and 
speaking to the art object. Another challenge that comes with addressing robotic 
art is the lack of a framework or reference point for evaluating its perceived 
liveliness and living potential. Since we do not inhabit mechanical robot bodies, it 
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may be hard to understand these non-human objects’ particular experience of the 
world.  
Methodology 
! The methodological approach to this research has been shaped by a desire 
to account for my own fascination with expressive and whimsical objects, and my 
bias towards these types of interactive, behaving and lively creatures. I am 
interested in the ways in which robotic art stimulates a powerful engagement for 
myself as a viewer as well as in the powerful affective and expressive 
characteristics communicated through individual works. To draw out the 
similarities presented in robotic work - mainly their lively behavioral and agentic 
qualities (framed by the umbrella concept of whimsy) - this thesis uses a 
combination of historical review (surveying the characteristics of robotic artistic 
production between 1970s and today) and artistic analysis. This mode of art 
criticism allows me to explore the behavioral aspects of robotic art through 
descriptive readings and explorations of the works’ physical characteristics and 
actions. The descriptions provided are meant to be visual and evocative in that 
they may transport the reader to a one on one (or possibly group) experience of 
the work. They are also informed by curatorial methodologies in that they 
consider the implications of factors like the environment, (spaces and ecologies in 
which these objects reside, enter into playful engagements with one another and 
the world, and are given access to experience) and interactivity. 
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! The theoretical framework underpinning the following text is invested in 
object analysis as it relates to ontological and metaphysical understanding of 
things. Borrowing from a canon of new media scholarship (Kac, Munster, Paul, 
Shanken) as well as contemporary object-oriented theories, this thesis explores the 
complex relationships between humans, things, technology, and the environment, 
as well as the object’s existence apart from the human domain. In regards to 
object theory, I take up the process philosophy of late 20th century philosopher 
Alfred North Whitehead, who inspired the scholarship of Object Oriented 
Ontology figurehead Graham Harman and English Professor and Speculative 
Realist philosopher Steven Shaviro, as well as feminist engagements with the 
world of objects, based in new materialist and vital materialist readings presented 
by scholars such as professor of Political Science Jane Bennett. My consideration 
of object and human experiences is also indebted to affect theory in the vein of 
Canadian social theorist and philosopher Brian Massumi as well as the writings of 
20th century French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. 
! Additionally, the thesis applies an art historical lens to robotic art in order 
to track legacies of such production and pinpoint the lineage of whimsicality; 
drawing behavioral comparisons between humans, animals and machines owing 
to analysis based in studies of play in order to attribute liveliness to robotic art. By 
calling for attention to whimsicality as an overarching characteristic of the art 
form, my aim is to give the behavioral qualities of robotic art due analysis. Lastly, 
by paying special attention to the reciprocity of playful actions, I highlight the 
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sociological implications of robotic art, with reference to 20th century French 
philosopher Michel Foucault’s interest in enchantment and contemporary French 
philosopher/sociologist Bruno Latour’s actor-network-theory.
! ‘Whimsical Bodies’ is a speculative theoretical research project, which 
considers the aspects of agency, liveliness and play in the robotic bodies of artists 
such as Steve Daniels, Erin Gee, Nam June Paik and Norman White with special 
attention to the robots’ capacity to act upon and interact with their environments, 
influence others, and create change in a gallery context. Whimsical robots demand 
attention in their playfulness due to their actions as quizzical, curious and animate 
beings. While this thesis is cemented in philosophical inquiry and critical theory, 
it holds potential for application to the production and curation of other whimsical 
robot-like bodies. 
! In the earliest developments of robotics these creatures were not 
considered art. Robots were developed to serve. They were created to perform 
necessary functions and often replace human labour in order to speed 
productivity / increase efficiency and later make way for a societal model driven 
by intellectual-capital. So how did robots become art? From where do these 
‘living’ sculptures stem? And how do we define the robotic creature today as the 
boundaries of artistic production and the abilities of the electronic medium 
continue to expand? It is important that we start from the beginning in order to 
delve deeper into the contemporary status and characteristics of robotic art.
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Chapter 1: The ‘Living’ Sculpture
! If artists working with or interested in robotics cannot ignore 
! mythological, !literary or industrial definitions of robots..., it is also true 
! that these definitions do not directly apply to any given robotic 
! artwork...As artists continue to push the very limits of art...they introduce 
! robotics as a new media at the same time that they challenge our 
! understandings of robots - questioning therefore our premises in 
! conceiving, building, and employing these electronic creatures.
-Eduardo Kac2
!
! As the cybernetic art of this generation grows more intelligent and 
! sensitive, the Greek obsession with ‘living’ sculpture will take on an 
! undreamed reality.
-Jack Burnham3
! New media art as a mode of artistic production or type of work is one that 
has become hard to pin down. Drawing its origins from the creative and curatorial 
engagements with new media technologies of the late 20th century, specifically 
video art, the term qualifies a broad range of practices and works today that 
require a constant rethinking of the ever-shifting definition of what is truly ‘new.’ 
The term new media itself applies to different objects according to different 
genealogies; a vast array of technologies that emerged after the industrial 
revolution as outlined by the field of media archaeology (Huhtamo 2011) and the 
sound and image-based vehicles of 20th century media spectacles such as film, 
television, and video as in the writings of influential media theorists like Marshall 
McLuhan (McLuhan 1994). One could also consider French philosopher Henri 
Bergson’s commentary on cinema in Matter and Memory as making a similar 
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2 Kac, Eduardo. “Foundations and Development of Robotic Art,” Art Journal, 56.3, Fall 1997: 60.
3 Burnham, Jack. Beyond Modern Sculpture; the Effects of Science and Technology on the 
Sculpture of This Century. New York: G. Braziller, 1968: 77.
argument by exploring how new modes of the moving, as opposed to still, image 
(including film) can be conceptualized. That was later taken up by Gilles Deleuze 
to explore the semiotics of film, extending the genealogy of philosophers and 
putting cinema under the rubric of new media. Today, in the 21st century, an 
earlier focus on film, television, and video as new media has expanded to 
primarily consider “computer based artistic activities” (Manovich 2003) and 
electronic media (Shanken 2009), which continue to place emphasis on movement 
and temporality, as opposed to static art. We now consider most of the objects 
foregrounded by these models well-established and no longer in the domain of 
‘new’ modes of artistic production. In the second decade of the 21st century, new 
media has come to be understood as a category that comprises mainly digital art in 
its various forms (Paul 2002). This might sound like a narrowing down of the 
term’s scope, making it more manageable; however, the proliferation of digital art 
itself, especially through cross-pollinations with science, engineering, and 
biology, opens it up to further dispersion. Manifesto Blanco, written in 1946 by 
artists and students in Buenos Aires under the direction of Italian artist and 
theorist Lucio Fontana, advocated for integrating art and science and moving 
towards “synthetic art”. The manifesto was one of the early celebrations of such 
expansion. As the manifesto argued, the importance of technology is clear in that 
“we are abandoning the use of known forms of art and we are initiating the 
development of an art based on the unity of time and space...matter, color and 
sound in motion are the new phenomena whose simultaneous development is an 
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integral part of the new art,” moving beyond the stasis of painting and sculpture 
and into new realms of production, beginning with the moving image and today 
characterized by various forms of moving and participatory digital art (Fontana 
1946).  
In many ways, robotic art has been viewed as one of the most challenging 
and hard-to-contextualize products of this shift. Where does this place robotics in 
the history of new media art - as a mode of artistic production that implies the use 
of technology and thus becomes subsumed under the umbrella of new media? 
Robotic art has oft been pushed to the outer recesses of the new media canon. 
Perhaps this is due to the fact that robotics may be viewed predominantly as a 
product of engineering and mechanical/industrial design, as opposed to art; for 
Eduardo Kac “the problem is the operational definition of robots as found in 
scientific research and industrial applications” (Kac 2001; 76). Or maybe it is 
robotic art’s perceived lack  of ‘seriousness,’ and critical depth due to its emphasis 
on modeling behavior as the artist values the actions and reactions of the robot in 
response to it’s environment as opposed to an valuation of concepts or form (Kac 
2001; 77). New media art’s definition remains elusive due to the fact that, 
according to curator and professor of Media Studies Christiane Paul, it is a 
“continuously evolving field, [the fact that new media art] evades definitions is 
one of its greatest assets and attractions, but at times the art seems to be more 
alive than its practitioners want it to be” (Paul 2012; 168). Maybe it is the lively 
and unpredictable nature of these objects that has made them hard to categorize. 
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Aside from the canonized literature that surrounds robotic work, including 
seminal texts by Eduardo Kac (2001) and art historian Edward Shanken (2009), 
discussions on the field have mostly been undertaken by makers and thus have 
been somewhat marginalized, resulting in a lack of diverse critical lenses through 
which contemporary works can be evaluated. 
!  I would like to argue that the whimsical nature of robotic art, and its 
potential lack of ‘seriousness’ could be one cause for the stranding of such work 
onto the periphery of the accepted modes of new media. However, it is precisely 
this lack of seriousness that can contribute to the work’s criticality - of culture, art, 
and technology itself (as well as the subsequent interactivity that it necessitates) - 
that can call for the legitimization of robotics as art within the new media canon. 
For Eduardo Kac the motivation behind robotic art is to present the behavioral 
qualities of technological beings (Kac 2001); causing such work to be viewed as 
theatrical and performative. This behavioral aspect of robotic art also requires 
some form of interactivity between human and machine or between machine and 
other machines. While all robots may denote an essence of interactivity - owing to 
the fact that they are objects not only to be perceived but are also able to perceive, 
in some capacity, the world around them - the specificity of robotic art must be 
noted. We can differentiate art robots from pragmatic robots according to the 
broader scope of their functions; “expanding the narrow definition of robots in 
science, engineering, and industry, art robots make room for social criticism, 
personal concerns, and the free play of imagination and fantasy” (Kac and Roca 
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1997). Robots are not fixed. They may break, malfunction, evolve, move, and 
prompt new responses each time they interact with another being. In this sense 
robotic art may be hard to classify. Such work demands new forms of engagement 
and viewership, which differ from pre-established conditions of art spectatorship 
such as those presented by a sculpture or painting. In regards to the human’s role 
in this shifting engagement, digital art historian Katja Kwastek notes that 
spectators are no longer spectators but rather have become ‘recipients’ whose 
engagement becomes interactive as the recipient is tasked, to some extent, with 
realizing the work of art (Kwastek 2013). New media theorist Lev Manovich also 
points to the phenomenon of interactivity. For Manovich, interactive new media 
creates a shift from representation to manipulation, which, in effect, places the 
subject in an entirely new structure of viewership similar to the setup of an 
experimental psychology lab (Manovich 1996). In this new mode of art 
production the art object and the recipient both appear to possess autonomy and 
the capacity to engage with one another - the resulting affective network assigns a 
new role to the curator in regards to their relationship with the artist and their 
work. For Christiane Paul “the standards for presenting, collecting and preserving 
art have been tailored to objects for the longest time and few of them are 
applicable to new media works, which constitute a shift from objects to 
process” (Paul 2012; 167). These art objects provide curators, artists and 
spectators with a new set of rules for navigating the gallery or museum;
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! The potentially interactive and participatory nature of new media projects - 
! which allow people to navigate, assemble or contribute to an artwork in a 
! way that goes beyond the interactive, mental event of experiencing it - 
! runs counter to the basic rule of museums, ‘Please do not touch the art’. 
! For the longest time, visitors of museums and galleries have entered art 
! spaces with the expectations to contemplate objects. Many works of new 
! media art do not only require active engagement but a certain familiarity 
! with interfaces and navigation paradigms. While visitors of new media art 
! festivals draw a more specialized audience that is largely knowledgeable 
! in ‘interface culture’, one cannot presume that the broader museum 
! audience consist of new media experts (Paul 2012; 167).
This new mode of viewership, requiring a more interactive experience, creates 
opportunities for reciprocal engagements between audience and work. This may 
also introduce new potential barriers to reciprocal engagements, however, the 
focus of this analysis is on the potentials of interactive play that become activated 
thanks to robotics.
! Robotic art is often based in humorous play as we can see in the example 
of contemporary Canadian new media artist Norman White’s Helpless Robot, 
1985, which features an electronically synthesized voice that seeks physical 
assistance from human participants only to mock them later as they make futile 
attempts to follow its increasingly domineering commands. Robotic art also 
depends on interactivity - whether this be with other robots, people or things - and 
thus connotes an aspect of reciprocal play that is not as present in other forms of 
new media work. The historical legacies of new media art cement robotics’ 
qualities as playful and whimsical. If, for Kac, robots’ key characteristic is their 
prioritizing of behaviors over form, the notion of ‘whimsy’ can be introduced as 
one way (a suggestive metaphor perhaps) of characterizing the behavioral aspect 
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of robotic beings. Whimsical things are not stagnant, nor are they mundane or 
inanimate. Whimsical things are evocative, they are lively, and they are vibrant.
A Brief History
! Regarding this notion of whimsy in relation to robotic art I would like to 
explore the genealogy of such work, with references to what I consider to be some 
of the most vibrant, behavioral and playful robotic works that have come from the 
field. Robotic art saw its origins in the 1960s though the movement did not appear 
from thin air. It was rather inspired by pioneering movements such as Dada and 
Fluxus that saw a merger with technology owing to the foundation of E.A.T. 
(Experiments in Art and Technology). E.A.T. was founded by Bell Telephone 
Laboratories’ electrical engineers Billy Klüver and Fred Waldhauer in order to 
“develop an effective collaboration between engineer and artist. The raison d'être 
of E.A.T. is the possibility of a work which is not the preconception of either the 
engineer or the artist, but is the result of the exploration of the human interaction 
between them” (Paul 2002; 472). The non-profit organization was developed out 
of a performative event held in 1966 called 9 Evenings: Theatre and Engineering; 
it was realized by a massive team of 40 engineers and 10 contemporary artists 
who worked together on performance art works that incorporated the use of new 
technologies. Engineers including founders Klüver and Waldhauer worked 
collaboratively with artists such as Robert Rauschenberg, Robert Whitman, and 
John Cage. The development of this organization marks the beginning of a 
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collaborative experimentation in art and technology, and cements the influence of 
the Dada and Fluxus movements onto the production of technology based work.
! The Fluxus and Dada movements - from which robotics gain much of their 
inspiration - presented a spirit of chaos, irrationality, performativity, playfulness 
and a strong resistance to institutional establishments (Kac 1999; Paul 2002). 
Swiss sculptor Jean Tinguely, influenced by Dada and best known for his kinetic 
sculptures, was one of the earliest sculptors to create “robotlike” mechanical 
structures including his “Machines à Peindre”, developed between the mid to late 
1950s (“Painting Machines”) (Encyclopedia Britannica). His kinetic sculptures, 
which he termed métaméchaniques or metamechanicals, were robotic in essence 
as they spun and moved in order to perform for viewers by, for example, painting 
a picture for the cost of a coin. In conjunction with a critical dadaist approach, 
recalling the earlier art historical movement, “his whimsical machines deftly 
satirized the mindless overproduction of material goods typical of advanced 
industrial society,” while also “express[ing] his conviction that the essence of both 
life and art consists of continuous change, movement, instability...refut[ing] the 
static art of the past” (Encyclopedia Britannica). As satire and humor were key 
aspects of Tinguely’s work - as well as for many other artists discussed in this 
chapter - it is important to note the importance of humor for dada artists, mainly 
influenced by the revolutionary work of Marcel Duchamp who would later inform 
Tinguely’s practice. Duchamp famously noted: “humor is very important in my 
life, as you know. The only reason for living, in fact” (1985). Duchamp’s 
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infamous Fountain, 1917 and Tinguely’s painting machines share a sense of 
“meta-irony” as their irony is, in itself, ironic. The irony of Duchamp’s Fountain 
lies in the contextualization of the object - a urinal - within the space of a gallery, 
while suspending it from context (Cook 1986; 268). The work is thus 
simultaneously urinal, art object and fountain through the lens of “R. Mutt”. The 
irony of Tinguely’s painting machines perhaps lies in the fact that the machines 
create abstract expressionist style paintings reminiscent of the works of Jackson 
Pollock and Vassily Kandinsky by means of a mechanical object created to 
eliminate the need for an artist, at the hand of an artist. What is also ironic about 
the machines is the fact that the abstract expressionist style they emulate 
celebrates the influence and spontaneity of the human hand and the subconscious 
creation of the artist. The automation of the machine may be viewed as 
contradictory to the potential for ‘chance’ celebrated by the abstract 
expressionists. The humor of these particular machines lies in their irony. In 
accord with the humorous nature of the work the objects themselves are 
aesthetically whimsical. The weird and fantastical objects appear like they are 
characters from a steam-punk cartoon. Mechanical cogs twist and turn as long thin 
metal ‘arms’ reach out towards paper. Long thin pieces of metal twist and turn in 
curly shapes beside circles of black material. The objects themselves look like 
Kandinsky’s musical paintings constructed out of mechanical metal pieces that 
have come to life in a mobile symphony of shapes. Tinguely’s early sculptures 
were lively, whimsical, kinetic and robotic. Perhaps we can view his work as 
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marking a paradigm shift away from static or stationary art towards the vivid, 
engaging and variable moving work of E.A.T.’s collaborative experiments in art 
and technology. 
! The projects of E.A.T. were the first complex collaborations between 
artists, engineers, programmers, researchers, and scientists that would become 
characteristic of the genre (Paul 2002). The exhibition Cybernetic Serendipity, 
1968 at the ICA in London curated by Jasia Reichardt is another example of such 
collaborative exhibitions, which presented early light and sound environments, 
participatory electronic art and sensing robotics. While the engineers were likely 
interested in the liveliness of robotic art - its behaviors, movements, and actions - 
the influence of figures such as Fluxus founder John Cage (whose father was an 
engineer and inventor) and iconic media artist Nam June Paik, focused the 
production of lively robotic art around more specific themes like performativity, 
humor, and play. These may have been perceived as ‘humble’ beginnings; 
however, “they still show characteristics and narratives of the medium 
today” (Paul 2002). In retrospect, postwar movements such as Fluxus presented 
an avant-garde sensibility towards art making that was revolutionary and 
subverted canonical understandings of Art; in the case of Fluxus, the subversion 
came in the form of introducing play as an integral element. As digital art and 
interactivity theorist Katja Kwastek observes: 
The disruption of traditional conceptions of the work in postwar art and its 
reflection in scholarly texts thus revealed new parallels between aesthetics 
and theories of play. In particular, the increasing...consideration given to 
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the recipient in the concept of art lead to new parallels between art and 
play (Kwastek 2013; 73). 
The anti-commercial, anti-art sensibility of the Fluxus artists were supported by 
their modes of production focused on creating work that was oft interactive and 
began with no conception of a foreseeable end. With an emphasis placed on the 
processes of creation rather than a finished product, the work explored notions of 
freedom which, like 20th century Dutch historian Johan Huizinga’s theory of play, 
placed emphasis on free activity that was not associated with material interest or 
profit. Play, like Fluxus art, is more about experiential interactions than outcomes.
Johan Huizinga’s study of play, Homo Ludens (1938), is oft considered to 
be the fundamental text on play theory today. Huizinga unpacks the characteristics 
of play; which I would like to pinpoint in the robots’ behavioral tendencies. For 
Huizinga, play is carried out as a means to its own end - ‘for its own sake’ - and is 
thus segregated from the requirements of practical life both spatially and 
temporally; “Play is not ‘ordinary’ or ‘real’ life. It is rather a stepping out of the 
‘real’ life into a temporary sphere of activity with a disposition all of its 
own” (Huizinga 1980; 8). This fact does not negate the meaningfulness or 
importance of play; it remains an essential activity for the human experience. This 
formulation of play enables us to draw links to the characteristics of whimsical 
robotic art objects and their playful nature. Firstly, for Huizinga, play is not a 
serious activity; it is not solemn or necessarily thoughtful but rather can be 
humorous, lowbrow, trivial and superficial; “the [perceived] inferiority of play is 
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continually being offset by the corresponding superiority of its seriousness. Play 
turns to seriousness and seriousness to play. Play may rise to heights of beauty 
and sublimity that leave seriousness far beneath” (Huizinga 1980; 8). A lack of 
seriousness does not discredit the importance of play. Secondly, where there is 
play there is also inherently meaning - play is meaningful for the players involved. 
Thirdly play is ‘free’ in that it does not need to fulfill a practical task to be 
satisfying; “the reality of play extends beyond the sphere of human life, it cannot 
have its foundations in any rational nexus, because this would limit it to 
mankind” (Huizinga 1980; 3). The motive of play is the experience that it affords 
- an experience that cannot be quantified. Play is not undertaken to acquire some 
extrinsic benefit; its essential function is the modulation of experience. Lastly, 
play involves a dynamic and reciprocal interaction. There is always an ‘other’ that 
is present; play is seldom a radically subjective experience but is rather 
constituted by the moment of otherness - the mystery and whimsy of the counter-
move. The act of ‘waiting to see’ and anticipating a response is an essential aspect 
to the activity of playing. Regarding these key characteristics of play we can also 
understand that the actions involved in play resist quantitative measure; the fact 
that they are essentially meaningful makes the experiences and feelings of play 
subjective and immeasurable. Play will remain, in some sense, an irrational 
activity.
 ! In contrast to the perceived irrationality of play stands the notion of 
structured rational thinking; such as that imposed by law and rule making. This 
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binary creates a problem within the scholarship and study of play due to the fact 
that play is characteristically defined by rules (Scheuerl; Huizinga). These rule 
systems are set out at the beginning of a playful interaction. The rules may be 
concrete, such as those set out by boardgames, or abstract, such as those presented 
by art viewership and engagement (don’t touch the object, don’t yell, etc.). On the 
other hand play also denotes freedom (Caillois; Scheuerl), voluntariness of 
participation and unproductiveness contrary to the constructs, limitations and 
perceived productivity of rule-regulated engagements. This tension between rule 
and freedom is emblematic of the simultaneous purposeless fun and rule 
boundedness of play. For Katja Kwastek “the free nature of play is comparable to 
the concept of autonomy in art and vacillates, like the latter, between the poles of 
cognitive and material independence” (Kwastek 74). The act of entering into a 
rule system of play is both voluntary and unmotivated by an interest in producing 
or attaining material goods.
! An early robotic work, which came out of the Fluxus movement prior to 
the development of E.A.T., Nam June Paik’s Robot K-456, presents a spirit of 
humorous play by focusing more on the behavioral spectacle of the object than the 
technical or engineering skills showcased in robotics. The humanoid robot’s 
construction began in 1963 and was completed by Paik and engineer Shuya Abe 
in 1964. Robot K-456 was a 20-channel radio controlled anthropomorphic bot, 
named after Mozart’s piano concerto, and an ode to the Fluxus admiration for 
music. The robot performed simplistic tasks such as moving its limbs, rotating its 
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head and eyes, and doffing its aluminum foil pie plate hat. The spectacle of the 
object is odd and fanciful. As the human-like bot was paraded down a New York 
street for the Second Annual New York Avant-Garde Festival it played a recording 
of John F. Kennedy’s inaugural address and excreted beans as a humorous act of 
performance. Although there is little written about the critical function of this 
performance, Robot K-456 provided a highly contested critique of gender 
normativity due to its monstrous hybrid body. Initially the bot was built with two 
mock breasts and a penis attached to its metal frame. However, after it generated 
negative reactions amongst critics Paik opted to remove the robot’s male genitals 
transforming the gender-bending creature into a ‘her’. Paik’s choice to assign a 
gender to the mechanical being humanized the creature while simultaneously 
making the robot more accessible to a public that was unable to relate to the 
robot’s gender fluidity. The public’s reaction to the work can be read as a failure to 
recognize the type of social commentary that Paik wanted to make, resonating 
with contemporary American philosopher and gender theorist Judith Butler and 
feminist science and technology theorist Donna Haraway’s arguments about the 
performativity of gender and how the figure of the cyborg bent gender normativity 
in the age of new media. Similarly, one can criticize Paik’s submission to public 
demands transforming the monstrous robot/male/female hybrid body into a lady 
bot; however, his initial design and subsequent comments on the revisions 
contextualize Paik’s point-of-view. Although the bot was censored, the lingering 
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images of its original hybrid body stand as a critical and subversive act on the part 
of Paik. 
! In a later work of performance art starring Robot K-456 titled The First 
Catastrophe of the Twenty-First Century, 1982, the bot was removed from the 
Whitney Museum of American Art and guided by Paik down the street on a casual 
stroll before being ‘accidentally’ struck by the passing vehicle of artist Bill 
Anastasi in the intersection of 75th street and Madison Avenue in New York City. 
This social commentary on technology and its envisioned future movement 
outside of human control was performed in a whimsical and playful manner. The 
quirky and intriguing image of Paik strolling down the road with a robot 
companion stolen from the Whitney is quite provocative as a choreographed 
catastrophe. 
! The spectacle of this object is inherently whimsical; the confusion 
generated by the sight of an anthropocentric robotic object (“creature” as Kac 
would put it) strolling down the street before being hit by a car is both amusing 
and memorable. There is a sense of awe and wonder presented by the machine - 
through its human-like attributes and seemingly autonomous life – and in the 
disinterested horror of witnessing the “death” of such a creature (I use the word 
disinterested because we are aware that it is a mechanical rather than a sentient 
being that is destroyed, which undermines the sense of dread experienced by the 
spectator, due to the fact that mechanical things can be fixed - making this 
performance more of an act of trickery on the part of Paik and his robot). Perhaps 
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the trickery involved here can be thought of as a form of vaudeville style 
attraction or magic trick, also recalling British science fiction author Arthur C. 
Clarke’s famous statement that any sufficiently advanced technology is 
indistinguishable from magic (Clarke, 1962). For some of the performance’s 
spectators, it may have been perceived as an exciting spectacle, in a similar vein 
to turn-of-the-century new media technologies or cinema of attractions (Gunning 
2006) resorted to practical magic for their affective import. There comes a sense 
of awe and wonderment instilled by a device that we cannot fully understand. This 
phenomenon has been described as karakuri - a Japanese term meaning either 
‘mechanism’ or ‘trick’. Karakuri describes a specific category of object, which has 
some form of concealed mechanism that allows the object to function, perform, 
act, and interact (Shea 2014). 
! Initially karakuri objects were puppets developed in Japan between the 
17th and 19th centuries. The mechanical dolls were created as a form of 
entertainment and would perform simplistic movements that were conducted by 
mechanical components hidden within the objects’ outer shell. They were used as 
both home and theatre entertainment, and would also be employed to perform 
reenactments of traditional myths and legends. The puppets represented both 
liveliness and concealment. They were active, mystical and enchanting by virtue 
of their alien inner lives. The concept of karakuri can be reinvigorated as a tool to 
interpret the display strategies for novel technologies in a gallery/museum 
context. We can understand that there exists “fluid, analogous relationships among 
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automata, puppets and robots – as well as magic, technology and 
craftsmanship” (Shea 2014; 46). The affective import of automata such as Paik’s 
Robot K-456 (electronic instead of mechanical in this case), and other such 
anthropomorphic lively objects, often depends on a sense of enchantment in the 
audience, and on what anthropologist Michael Shea points out as the ‘odd trick’, 
performed in Paik’s work by the staged car accident. While such work oft instills 
a sense of awe, there is also an underlying truth to the functioning of the machine, 
which is likely not reported. For Shea “it does not matter whether or not the 
technology on display is genuine; so long as the audience does not understand the 
mechanisms behind the performance, the impact is the same. Karakuri ningyō, 
robots and puppets can all convince us, at least temporarily, that they are living. 
This is the trick” (Shea 2014; 46). He offers the example of iconic autonomous 
robot ASIMO to illustrate that the hidden qualities, or ‘tricks’, of the machine may 
be under a greater human influence than we would suspect. In the case of ASIMO, 
a humanoid robot and multi-functional mobile assistant developed by Honda and 
introduced in October of 2000, Shea describes the bot as “effectively-remote 
controlled by staff behind the scenes” while, “to the audience ASIMO is presented 
as sentient” (Shea 2014; 45). ASIMO and Robot K-456 are both performative 
automata that are controlled, in some aspect, by humans. ASIMO presents us with 
a more typical karakuri object as it is magical and lively while maintaining the 
mystery of its inner working; the technology, which supports its human-controlled 
functioning. Robot K-456, on the other hand, presents an interesting dichotomy in 
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relationship to the karakuri method of producing performative automata. Paik’s 
robot is obviously lively - because of its ability to move, perform and engage with 
others – and it is also anthropomorphic, like ASIMO; however, it presents us with 
an aesthetic that celebrates the inner functions and mechanical nature of the bot as 
opposed to the tradition of karakuri, which makes these aspects hidden. 
! Robot K-456 is an assemblage of things. Its frame is composed of thin 
lengths of metal that are wrapped with coloured wires spinning like weeds around 
its body. A single speaker forms the robot’s mouth. Its mechanical hands dangle 
tenuously from haphazardly constructed arms. A small fan spins in the center of 
the bot’s body while a mess of intricately tangled wires pool around its right leg 
and foot. All of the robot’s wiring and circuitry are exposed to the viewer. Robot-
K-456 is neither sleek nor sturdy with its inner workings presented as a mass of 
messy mechanical parts.   
! The spectacle of Robot K-456 with its guts exposed calls to a new type of 
enchantment that is not fueled by the mystery of the machine’s inner workings 
and its ability to act like a human. The robot takes on a life of its own, outside of a 
humanizing framework. It does not seek to model humans exactly, but rather 
presents us with an entirely new image of the body that is hybrid (of human and 
machine, art and technology). The robot lays bare its own body as an object of 
study (reminiscent of Duchamp’s “The Bride Stripped Bare By Her Bachelors” 
and artist and Digital Humanities professor Mary Flanagan’s re-reading of that 
work in “The Bride Stripped Bare to Her Data”). These bodies are both alien and 
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familiar. They present us with an image that registers humanness while 
simultaneously bastardizing our own notions of the human body. The karakuri’s 
porcelain painted body – presenting us with an image of human ‘perfection’: soft 
lips, almond eyes and rosy pink cheeks – is opened up to reveal a horde of 
mechanical parts. Like body-modifying contemporary French artist Orlan’s 
surgical performance - in which the body is stripped bare of its skin, displaying 
the inner workings of ourselves as an image of abject horror (Carlson 2011) - the 
robot body, such as that of karakuri with its inner working exposed or Robot 
K-456, which has already been stripped bare with its insides made visible to us, 
presents a new type of horror. This horror is presented in the form of flaying a 
lively body; but to a new type of abject fear we are presented with a technological 
body. The inner workings that control the movements of the body are not of a 
human nature; they are machinic. This body, while lively and formally mimicking 
human anatomy, induces terror in the way it pits life against mechanics, as we are 
exposed to the inner workings of a thing that is lively on the surface. 
Simultaneously, the presentation of “the in-between, the ambiguous, the 
composite” (Kristeva 4) provokes a feeling of wonder - this may be a horrified 
wonder - when viewing the robot body. 
Programmed Behavior & Sensing Bots!
Edward Ihnatowicz’s The Senster, 1969-70 is another example of a 
performative human-modeled and enchanting robot that expresses its inner 
workings and reflects a new direction in the development and aesthetic in robotic 
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art of the period. The Senster, arguably the most iconic work of the Polish 
cybernetic sculptor, was a large hydraulically actuated robot that sensed and 
responded to its environment. The fifteen-foot lumbering bot was built to 
resemble a massive mechanical lobster claw and occupied a space of 1000 cubic 
feet. Built into the structure of the head were sensitive microphones and motion-
detectors that allowed the creature to sense its environment. Environmental 
stimuli were processed by a digital Philips minicomputer in real time allowing it 
to playfully engage with those around it. The Senster’s body was formed of six 
independent electro-hydraulic servomechanisms with six degrees of freedom in 
their movement. According to Kac, this interactive playful robot was the first 
instance of behavioral autonomy in art (Kac 2001). The massive metal claw was 
given a programmed personality through which the bot responded to humans and 
its changing environment. The Senster would slowly and laboriously shift its head 
away from areas of activity towards quieter and more subdued viewers. Those 
who were loud and mobile saw the gentle giant shy away and protect itself from 
perceived threats or aggressors. This marks the beginning of a shifting mentality 
amongst robotic artists towards the exploration of programmed behavior and the 
assignment of autonomy and some type of agency to robots. 
The massive mechanical structure can elicit a sense of recognition from 
viewers as they watch its self-protective and shy behaviors. Or one might feel 
sympathetic to the creature on display as it attempts to escape from the loud and 
noisy crowd that it simultaneously draws in through the spectacle of its massive 
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mobile mechanical body. The Senster performs as an animalistic being, with its 
behaviors mimicking the way prey animals act in nature and made visible to the 
human viewers positioned as predator. While the robot is large and lumbering and 
aesthetically fear inducing upon first glance, its behavioral qualities - making 
reference to animal instincts - expose the robot’s fear and inability to defend and 
protect its body. The frightened creature senses and responds to its environment in 
a way that creates empathy in its predatory audience while some may seek to 
exploit their power or “prey drive” over the massive machine by taunting and 
teasing it to further incapacitate the bot. I will unpack this notion of animal 
behavior in the next section, but a little more elaboration on the sensory potentials 
of robotic art as it relates to user engagement and reciprocal interactions between 
human and machine might be relevant here.
! Norman White has created a number of robotic works, which call for user 
engagement precipitated by their sensory data cues. White began working in 
manual electronics but moved towards the immaterial languages of programming 
software in 1976. His first machine built according to the logic of computer 
programming and displaying robotic characteristics was Facing Out Laying Low 
(FOLL), 1977. Though the work was not autonomous it manifested a simulated 
mode of independence as a result of its programmed behaviors and ability to react 
in real-time. The bot looked for substantial deviations and fluctuations in its 
surrounding light patterns, likely caused by the movements of humans, and would 
begin to ‘ignore’ areas of the room with stagnant light. The Motorola D-1 
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computer that controlled the robot also registered and stored environmental data 
based on present and past experiences of the machine. As a result, FOLL’s actions 
were highly unpredictable as its coded responses would draw stimuli from its 
current and past data. For Norman White, this element of chance and 
unpredictability is essential to his practice, in the same way that it was to the 
predecessors of robotic art such as John Cage who believed that art requires the 
maker to “give yourself up” in some capacity to find the “sweet spot” between 
constraints and freedom. When building and exhibiting a work White asserts, “I 
think things are more interesting when I am not in complete control, when I am as 
much surprised as anybody else as to what takes place” (White 2006). He wants to 
make things that have a life of their own, that act in a whimsical and playful way, 
which is expressed by objects that are both biological in function and mechanical 
in construction. A key concept for White is the ‘living effect’ represented in his 
work’s whimsical behavioral outbursts, temperamental qualities and the non-
cooperative essence of FOLL. The robot “talks when it feels like talking” or it 
may ‘sulk’; regardless, the bot “requires the same patience that you would give to 
a living creature” (White, 2006). The spontaneous and unpredictable nature of the 
machine expresses its living qualities to us. The lively capricious creature presents 
an engaging mode of behavior that is still a point of reference for the work of 
robotic artists today.
! The robot’s behaviors are regulated by its programming, its own physical 
abilities and its surrounding environment. Norman White creates work that 
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embraces both constraint and freedom. The robot is constrained by the 
characteristics imposed upon it by the artist’s hand while it also maintains some 
autonomy owing to its programming that allows it to act towards, and adapt to, its 
random and ever changing environmental stimuli. This is where a third party may 
enter the scene; the human spectator. The third party or participant of the scene 
has the ability to influence the robot’s performance as the bot senses a new being 
with which to engage in play and interact. The ensuing interaction between human 
and machine resembles the process of any gameplay, in that the realization of the 
work’s performance will depend (though not entirely) on the viewer/participant/
player: “it is in the playing that a chessboard comes alive, and the game object 
becomes a catalyst for play” (Pearce 70). In sensing their environment, the human 
and robot become intertwined in an act of performative play. While human 
interactivity remains an important aspect of much of the robotic work in this 
manner, I would like, for a moment, to broaden the scope of this analysis and turn 
to animals as a counterpoint from which to study robotic behaviors and 
interactions. 
Modeling Animals!
! The lure of animal instinct appears to be an important consideration for the 
development of artificially intelligent (or semi-autonomous) robotic creatures. 
Studying the behaviors and playful engagements of animals (like humans) 
provides artists with an alternative model for the development of whimsical robot 
bodies. Animals, which constitute the biological ‘Other’ for humans, present us 
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with a different configuration of embodiment, through which we can establish and 
study robots as lively entities. As with the predator/prey scenario presented earlier 
by Edward Ihnatowicz’s The Senster, we can program and detect varying types 
and degrees of animal behavior in robots. The work of Norman White provides a 
strong entry point to discussion in this context too. Ménage, 1974, which was an 
installation of five interactive robots that engaged with one another, combines the 
artist’s interest in spontaneous chance interactions and the behavioral study of the 
animal kingdom. The work was inspired by neurophysiologist and robotician 
Grey Walter’s experimental tortoises, which were some of the first electronic 
autonomous robots. Walter’s first set of robots, constructed between 1948 and 
1949, were named Elmer and Elsie. The robots were oft described as tortoises due 
to their aesthetic appearance as tortoise-like animals as well as their slow pace of 
movement. The tortoises were developed to participate in a number of 
experiments that Walter conducted in order to study the ways in which the brain 
worked - through mechanical beings (Pickering 2010). One such experiment 
involving Elmer and Elsie tested the robots’ ability to become self-aware. Walter 
attached a light to the ‘nose’ of the tortoise and watched the robot as it observed 
itself in a mirror. The bot flickered, jiggled and twitched like a ‘clumsy Narcissus’ 
according to Walter as he argued that the tortoise had displayed some evidence of 
self-awareness. The interest in creating artificial life echoes far beyond Walter’s 
tortoises as, according to Edward Shanken’s study of the historical legacy of new 
media art, “in many cases, artists have attempted to bridge the apparent divide 
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between carbon-based organisms and silicon forms of intelligence and life, 
between the real and the artificial, suggesting that these distinctions are becoming 
increasingly blurry and permeable” (Shanken 38). White’s Ménage follows in the 
footsteps of Walter’s intelligent robotic creatures as he creates experimental works 
that explore the potential of animal behavior in autonomous machines. Animal 
behavior, like that of human, is expressed by way of their actions. Anthropologist 
Robert Fagen’s canonical text on animal play divides these actions into five 
unique, though fuzzy, categories of play engagement in which animals participate. 
The five types of play are; (1) isolated play presented through repetitive and brief 
movements, (2) non-contact solo play/social play of moving bodies through space, 
(3) social play (with or without contact) that involves chasing or sparring/
wrestling, (4) complex social play that involves the inclusion of objects and 
features of the landscape, and finally (5) mother-infant games such as peekaboo or 
building and breaking structures composed of smaller objects (Fagen 1981; 
Sutton-Smith 1997). He also asserts that only a small number of animal species 
have the capacity for play, “mammals and birds, and perhaps a few fish and 
reptiles are the only kinds of animals known to play” (Fagen 1995; 24). Their 
ability to play is expressed by “specific movement qualities and signal 
patterns” (Fagen 1995; 24), which enable us to see that they are playing. It is 
interesting to note that the line of robotics presented in this section as modeling 
animals does in fact conform to Fagen’s assertion that play is reserved to 
mammals, birds and a few fish and reptiles. None of the robotic creatures fall 
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outside of these categories of play according to their programmed behaviors and 
interactions. 
! Let us turn back to the work of art in order to more fully understand 
Fagen’s modes of animal play as they relate to bot behaviors. Ménage’s five light-
sensing robots engaged with one another due to their sensory perceptions and 
programmed desires to interact. Four of the robots were mounted to ceiling tracks 
on which they could move back and forth around the room, across paths limited 
by them. The fifth robot was positioned on the floor and could move around more 
freely. Each of the five creatures was equipped with a scanner that was able to 
sense strong light-sources and communicate the sense perceptions to a computer 
controlling the bots’ behaviors. Each robot was also equipped with a spotlight 
mounted to its centre body. The robots would lock onto each other’s gazes as their 
spotlights would intersect and compel the mechanical bodies to move together. 
The autonomy of the ceiling robots was somewhat compromised in that they 
could be controlled and pulled apart by non-responsive track-motors. The 
simplistic response and control systems of the robots created unique and complex 
behaviors amongst the creatures as they locked ‘eyes’, connected for a brief 
moment before being pulled apart and beginning their search again for a new light 
source. The robots had a lively quality that pushed and pulled them to act, behave 
and play with one another.
! Fagen’s third form of animal behavior, that of social play, is echoed in the 
behaviors of the Ménage robots. As the robots chase one another around the room, 
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they seem to be modeling the behaviors of most primates and carnivores, 
pinnipeds, marsupials and some birds, through their participation in the social 
play of chasing (Sutton-Smith 1997; 23). According to Fagen, the characteristics 
of animal play, related to the social play interaction involved in chasing, are: 
repetition, reversal, fragmentation, exaggeration, inhibition and unpredictability. 
For Norman White the unpredictability of the robots’ playful interactions would 
likely be the most important feature of the work; however, the bots also 
participate in an engagement that is repetitive (through their ongoing quest to 
move towards one another), reversed (as their actions to draw together are denied 
by the track’s integrated programming to pull them apart), fragmented (as their 
playful engagement may be interrupted by human interlopers), exaggerated (by 
their mechanical bodies as they whizz and whur around the gallery space), 
inhibited (by their programming to play above all else), and of course 
unpredictable as the multiplicity of their possible movements and interactions 
highlight the randomness of their performance. It is by virtue of the narrative of 
animal interaction that Ménage’s performance is born. This is only one example 
of robotic art modelling animal behavior, along with the earlier example of The 
Senster. Animal influence can also be explored through the reoccurring theme of 
‘cuteness.’
The Little Pygmalion: Cuteness as Critique
! Following the legacy of Norman White’s lively and interactive robotic 
beings, Jim Pallas’s Nose Wazoo, 1990, resembles an object pulled from a 
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children’s novel. As American electro-kinetic sculptor Pallas describes the 
motivation behind the work on his webpage, “in the Frankenstein myth, man 
created a being that destroys him. While the myth is often associated with 
technology, I’m more interested in Pygmalia who creates something to fall in love 
with” (“jpallas.com”). The Nose Wazoo is equipped with four photocell eyes and 
an infrared sensor enabling it to observe its surrounding environment. The 
creature seeks out and responds to humans as it flexes its long neck and extends 
its nose up to 20 inches towards the viewers as it attempts to nudge them to get 
some attention. Its lower body is covered in sisal fibers, beads and wires while its 
head, though also furry, is much more mechanical looking with the exception of a 
molded human nose at the tip of an extendable metal pole. The Nose Wazoo 
gathers viewers due to its silly performances as it flings its body around with 
“back flips” and “floorscrapes”. Once it has gathered a crowd with its enchanting 
performance the creature will try to nudge humans around it with its extendable 
nose. The Nose Wazoo is unexpectedly temperamental and can easily retreat from 
its peacocking display to sulk if a viewer teases it with an excess of stimuli. The 
Nose Wazoo is playful and engaging, and can enthrall viewers through its 
seemingly human-like and lively behaviors. However, the creature is furry and 
fuzzy and in some way cute, looking more like an animal than a human. 
According to zoologist Konrad Lorenz, infantile or cute features trigger a 
nurturing response in adults; smallness and furriness are especially among the 
stereotypes of cuteness that play into this cross-cultural phenomenon. Alongside 
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the animal behaviors discussed in the last section as informing robotic art, it is 
important to note that robotic creatures often take on the role of not only prey 
versus predator but also cute versus monstrous or threatening animals. Works such 
as the Nose Wazoo, Ménage and The Senster are non-confrontational, cute and 
even cowardly (as in the case of The Senster). These bots do not impose 
themselves on the viewer but are rather friendly, non-threatening bodies that enter 
into the sphere of liveliness in such a way as not to create fear. Robotic art, in the 
survey presented thus far and to come, is allowed to become lively, behavioral, 
playful and agentic on account of its non-confrontational status. These bots are 
not menacing or scary like the vengeful and humanesque robots in films such as I, 
Robot (2004) and Ex Machina (2015). In looking to cultural examples of robotics 
in film it is evident that there exists a dichotomy between representations in the 
virtual animated world and the physical development of bots. The monstrous and 
threatening bodies presented through film do exist in the art world. Rather, robot 
bodies are made small, cute, quaint, amusing and above-all non-threatening to a 
human spectator. While the humanoid robot army in I, Robot and the intelligent 
Ava from Ex Machina, who appears to have a mind and will of her own, present 
us with an image of robots as technological substitutes for humans and a threat to 
the continuation of our species, the cute and animalistic robotic art objects present 
us with a more palatable - though potentially as critical and subversive (see Little 
Brother) - form of artificial life and intelligence.  
38
! The smallness, cuteness and quaintness – in other words, whimsicality – of 
robots are represented in the aesthetic and performative behaviors of the Nose 
Wazoo. Its mischievous movements draw the focus to endearing attempts to gain 
attention. The creature is lovable and sweet as it compels the viewer to 
acknowledge, engage with, and even nurture the misbehaving machine. Even the 
name Nose Wazoo triggers a sense of silliness for the human viewer. 
! Cuteness can also function as a mode of subversive activism in robotic art. 
Pamphleteer aka “Little Brother” was a propaganda robot developed in 1998 by 
the Institute for Applied Autonomy (IAA); an activist group founded in 1998 and 
dedicated to the dissemination of knowledge, autonomy, and methods of self-
determination by way of technological means. The adorable and small robot is a 
simplified creature constructed of metal with claw shaped ‘hands’ and large oval 
shaped ‘eyes’ that cover nearly the whole head of the bot. The Little Brother’s 
limited features and solid square body make the robot appear as an even more 
streamline version of ASIMO. The robot’s massive sad eyes instill empathy in the 
viewer as they watch the cute robot distribute flyers to passersby. Little Brother 
capitalizes on its cute aesthetic in order to distribute various subversive 
propaganda literature to the public. Automating the oft-dangerous act of activist 
campaigning and making the distributer adorable allows the bot to infiltrate spaces 
that would likely be inaccessible to humans. The robot has been sent out in 
various field tests and the viewer responses have nearly unanimously attributed 
the robot’s cuteness to its ability to act in a subversive and critical matter without 
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a negative response. The bot, who has also been adopted as the IAA’s spokesman, 
is able to veil its cultural and social criticism underneath its nonthreatening 
aesthetic. In this case the cuteness of the bot enables it to stealthily enter into a 
minefield of social relations relatively unscathed. 
! How are cute robots such as Little Brother able to navigate social spheres 
and interface with humans while enabling us to more easily adopt autonomous 
machines? Here, I would like to explore another Japanese phenomenon, that of 
Kawaii, as a tool used to soften the advanced features of Japanese technological 
culture with the cuteness of kitties, bears and puppies and their large heart-melting 
eyes and rosy cheeks. The Japanese style of ‘Kawaii’ embodies a special kind of 
cute design that could be used to inform designers of leisure and pleasure objects - 
and more specifically in the case of my research: interactive media - how to 
engage users in a way which reduces fear and makes dreary information more 
acceptable and appealing. An analogy could be thought of as the bitter pill with a 
flavored layer that makes the consumption of the medicine more 
agreeable” (Cheok 2010; 299). The analogy of a bitter pill can also be applied to 
the ‘cute’ robotic works I have previously mentioned. For example, Little Brother 
is a confrontational activist, who assaults humans with controversial views on the 
contemporary social and cultural climate by offering them informational 
pamphlets. Although his socio-political criticism remains veiled underneath the 
sweet ‘flavored layer’ of the bot’s cute aesthetic. Professor of Pervasive 
Computing Adrian Cheok expands upon this analogy to address a parallel between 
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the “cold, digital, electronic, and unsettling internal components of a system and 
the bitter pill;” notably, “the ‘flavored coating’ is the cute user interface, which is 
made more agreeable by establishing a relationship with the user and delivering 
the content of a system in a more friendly and attractive way” (Cheok 2010; 299). 
Therefore the content, or message, communicated by the work of art is softened 
and made more agreeable for the human spectator. By reducing fear and 
apprehension towards new technologies and the insinuated terror of autonomous 
robots or artificial life, these bots use cuteness as a gateway to enter the human 
realm.
! Robotic art may also fall under the category of Kawaii due to the fact that 
the viewer is oft presented with a ‘trick’ (as discussed earlier in relationship to 
karakuri objects) and surprise. The user or viewer is meant to be surprised or 
caught off guard. Interactivity is essential to Kawaii as the surprise presented “to 
the user plants the initial emotion through which the continuing experience is 
colored;” that in turn begins the ‘micro-relationship’ between user and object. 
(Cheok 2010; 300). Creatures such as the Nose Wazoo present the viewer with an 
interactive surprise in the form of the object’s performativity and its quest to reach 
out and tap humans with its extendable nose. This micro-relationship is a short-
lived superficial relationship between the cute object or creature and the human. It 
is likely not lasting, and may lack critical depth; however, it may be extremely 
impactful as a memory, a mode of provoking thought or a highly emotional and 
possibly even endearing engagement. According to the logic of Kawaii, the 
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defining characteristic of cute creatures is evoking “the feelings and emotions that 
are caused by experiencing something that is charming, cheerful, happy, funny, or 
something that is very sweet innocent or pure. It can stimulate a feeling of 
adoration, sympathy, or stimulating the care response” (Cheok 2010; 301). 
Keeping this framing in mind, I would like to talk about cuteness in relationship 
to one more example of robotic art.
! Nose Wazoo and Pamphleteer were not the first whimsical or cute 
interactive artworks to be produced in the field. Contemporary electronic artist 
Simon Penny’s Petit Mal, 1989-93 is an earlier and less anthropomorphic bot; 
however, it presents a mischievous quaintness similar to that of the Nose Wazoo. 
For Penny, the aim of Petit Mal was to develop a charming and truly autonomous 
robotic art object. Petit Mal, like Nose Wazoo, senses and explores its 
surroundings, specifically architectural space, while also pursuing and reacting to 
humans. Petit Mal does not bear an anthropomorphic or zoomorphic physical 
appearance; the robot is meant to foreground and celebrate its electronic nature, 
placing the emphasis on artificial intelligence (as opposed to an automaton-like 
configuration or simulation of a biological being). It appears curious and reactive 
– on a ‘voyage of discovery’ – as it explores the surrounding environment and 
responds in real time. In neurological terminology ‘petit mal’ is a momentary loss 
off consciousness experienced by humans. This name appeals to the slightly 
chaotic and unpredictable nature of the bot, which Penny purposefully constructed 
to be a little out of control. The mechanical structure of the bot is stable; however 
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it has an in-built chaotic motion generator that makes it an ‘emblem of 
unpredictability,’ in the same way that the works of Norman White function (as 
this chapter explored earlier). This behavioral aspect of the robot gives it both an 
intelligent quality and a unique personality. Although the object is neither 
anthropocentric nor zoomorphic its flowery coating (in the form of a flower 
printed table cloth-esque fabric covering the metal exterior of the bot) renders it 
less technological and more humanized (inviting associations of domesticity and 
intimacy). Perhaps the pattern is meant to make the subject more relatable, quaint 
and friendly. Penny’s interest in humor would keep affect at the surface, drawing 
attention to the immediacy of its trans-corporeal flows rather than the robot’s 
evocation of intelligence and ability to store memories or map its surroundings. 
The bot is reactive and experiences only its realtime embodiment while 
interacting with humans. Petit Mal’s apparent lack of mindfulness or a strong 
memory makes the bot friendly, accessible and unthreatening. The cutesy flowers 
present a sensibility of comfort that allows the bot to intrude into the spaces of 
humans and enable it to play freely with others. 
! Though structured by the limitations of their physical bodies, exhibitionary 
structures, and programming, these robots display some autonomy through their 
ability to act freely - oft outside or in excess of the constructed limitations of their 
exhibition as in the case of Norman White’s interest in the unmediated potential of 
his work outside of his interference. Thus whimsical robotic art carries the 
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potential to have autonomy that is not cemented in rules and regulation due to its 
engagement in play.
Bringing Bots to Life
! In attempting to contextualize robotics within the larger field of new media 
art, I propose establishing an aesthetic and ontological framework that pays 
attention to the unique characteristics or signifying qualities of the medium. As I 
mentioned earlier, robotic art has been pushed to the outer recesses of the canon, 
perhaps due to its playful and lighthearted nature, which is interpreted as 
overwriting its criticality or content driven value. Viewers may marvel at the 
novel nature of robotic creatures without considering the greater critical ecologies 
in which such work is brought to life (pun intended) or the motivations of the 
artist. In exploring the dada and fluxus lineages of robotics, we can implicate 
these movements in robotic art’s playful, humorous and participatory nature. The 
emphasis on both engineering and art in the establishment of E.A.T., and by its 
affiliated artists, may have cautioned the field against exclusively 
anthropomorphic aestheticization of robots. Considering animal modeling (both 
aesthetically and behaviorally) and explorations of cuteness as a critical lens, 
artists such as Nam June Paik, Norman White, and Simon Penny have lead the 
field towards emphasizing behavioral qualities (human and nonhuman), 
playfulness and interactivity. 
! Robotic art, and new media art more generally, face an inherent problem 
of exhibition, as exemplified in the stranding of such work onto the peripheral 
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spaces of the gallery and in the separation of ‘Art’ from ‘new media art’. As 
Christiane Paul notes, the segregation of new media art to exterior zones such as 
‘new media spaces’ or ‘lounges’ oft provokes a “‘ghettoization’ - contributing to 
the separation of the art form from more traditional media and epitomizing the 
uneasy relationship that institutions tend to have with the medium at this point in 
time” (Paul 2012; 170). We can continue to question the space for new media as 
the field grows ever-more expansive with the introduction of new work, which 
continues the legacies of participatory, evocative, playful and behaving robots that 
are literally and figuratively hard to pin down. In doing so, perhaps artists and the 
curators of such objects may develop alternative venues for robots that are 
inherently lively and engaging; they may be cute, sweet, human or animal-like but 
they consistently appear as vivacious, engaging and animated. Considering their 
behavioral features might allow us to better comprehend their nature and make 
room (or create new spaces) for their proliferation. 
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Chapter 2: 
Robot Behaviors: Outbreaks, Testimonies and Propositions
!
! We need to be able to consult nonhumans more closely, to listen and 
! respond to their outbreaks, testimonies and propositions.
   -Jane Bennett4
 
! Imagine a small autonomous robot with light sensors - symbolizing ‘eyes’ 
- attached to gangly protruding wires that bobble around atop its body. The 
creature zooms around the hardwood floor of the Art Gallery of Peterborough; it is 
part of an experimental test project, which features a set of eight autonomous 
interactive sensing robots with the ability to “explore simple behavioral rule 
systems in an embodied context” (“Spinning the Web”). In a lecture given at 
Ryerson University about the project, evocatively titled as Whimsy (2007) (Fig. 
1), Steve Daniels describes the vision behind the robots’ design as one that 
situates it on the periphery of distinct knowledge systems, resisting 
characterization either as an ‘art’ object or a scientific experiment (Daniels 2015). 
Though Daniels identifies himself as an artist, his robotic objects were never 
intended for public viewing or exhibited publicly as works of art. Rather, they 
were implemented in a handful of trials at his studio and in one of the Art Gallery 
of Peterborough’s exhibition spaces as a ‘non-scientific’ experiment (for the 
purpose of informing later gallery-exhibited art works such as Sessile, which I 
will discuss later in this chapter). The understanding was that they would be 
observed and studied only by a small group of people including Daniels himself 
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4 Bennett, Jane. Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Durham: Duke UP, 2010: 108.
and a number of his friends/colleagues. The robotic creatures’ essence lies 
somewhere between art and experiment, by way of observations that are both 
aesthetic and scientific. According to Daniels Whimsy acts as “a kind of 
behavioral maquette;” he confirms their liminal essence as creatures that linger on 
the cusp between art and science, claiming that “they are art objects -- they were 
my first attempt as locomotive agents” (Daniels 2016).
The material and electronic set-up of the project is as follows: the robots, 
or ‘whimsies’, are equipped with sensory-actuator routing rules and real-time 
feedback systems controlled by visual sensors attached to the body of the machine 
using wobbly lengths of metal - different heights on each individual bot - that 
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Figure 1. Steve Daniels, Whimsy, 2007. Image courtesy of the artist.
extend the visual sensors, or ‘eyes’, out above the bots. Aesthetically the whimsies 
can be regarded as simplistic DIY5  constructions in that they celebrate the hand-
made nature of the machine through exposed hardware components such as 
circuitry and a heaping bunch of multicolored wires housed inside a wooden 
construction. The scale of the robots is friendly; reaching only slightly higher than 
the viewers’ ankles (Fig. 2). During the experiment they are unleashed into a large 
open space where they are able to move around and interact with one another as 
their sensual data is transformed into real-time action. Their movements, 
controlled by sensory motivated routing rules, can be interrupted or rerouted 
based upon their relations.
! The foregrounding of the Whimsy bots’ eyes draws attention to the fact 
that Daniels’s robots are programmed to see. To what extent the objects are able to 
see and access phenomenological experience can only be speculated; though their 
behaviors - informed by sensory data acquired by visual sensors - tell us that they 
have some ability to act in an agentic capacity. The ‘whimsies’ - as Daniels refers 
to the bots – have been created as “hardware agents” to try out neuroscientist 
Valentino Braitenberg’s conception of artificially intelligent and autonomous 
vehicle types. In his 1984 study, Braitenberg describes potential behavioral 
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5 Do-it-yourself. As opposed to a more streamlined futuristic presentation of autonomous robots as 
solid sleek metal constructions that conceal the inner workings of the machine. The method of 
production draws its origins from the DIY movement; a movement that is primarily associated 
with the late 19th early 20th century Arts and Crafts movement. Synonymous with at home 
improvement and craft production, the DIY movement was offered as an alternative to modern 
consumer culture’s emphasis on mass production and the reliance on others to satisfy one’s 
material needs. 
patterns, which can be programmed internally into vehicular machines, using 
simple hardware systems: a collection of environmental sensors, wheel-driving 
motors, various threshold devices and a few fictional components with special 
properties that are nonetheless logically and technologically plausible. Moving 
from programmable 
behavioral patterns to 
the idea of behaving 
machines, he 
proposes fourteen 
hypothetical types of 
autonomous vehicles, 
including robots 
whose light sensors 
control movements 
of attached wheels 
(on one or both sides 
of their bodies). In 
this manner, the 
Whimsy robots 
follow Braitenberg’s hypothesis for the development of artificial intelligence, 
though, according to Daniels, were not entirely successful in their behavioral 
outcome at the time of their development as he notes; “at the time I think I 
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Figure 2. Steve Daniels, Whimsy, 2007. Image courtesy of the artist.
perceived them as failures -- they seemed too clinical or proscribed, perhaps. But 
they have come to occupy a different space for me. They were a very important 
stepping stone. They opened the door to Sessile and a current work tentatively 
called Trace (working title). I think they reflect where I was and embody a sort of 
naive curiosity that I have come to really like” (Daniels 2016).
 ! In order to comply with Braitenberg’s6 vehicle designs, Daniels had to 
create two distinct behavioral forms across the eight whimsies, categorized as a 
and b (Fig. 3). The two sets of behaviors were developed to evoke two different 
reactionary impulses in the bots as 
they physically approach an object, 
which in the case of the project is 
established as a predominant source 
of light. Behavioral forms a and b are 
visibly distinguishable to the 
potential viewer based upon the 
robots’ wheel colour; red or black. 
When the visual sensors pick up light and communicate this sensory input to the 
robots’ actuators, they will send the information to the robots’ central brain, 
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6 Though Braitenberg is a primary source for such of Daniels’ work he also takes inspiration, like 
his predecessor Norman White, from Grey Walter’s tortoises Elmer and Elsie. Daniels asserts that 
“Grey Walter's work lives at the deep core of most of my experiments. I really admire the analog 
solution and the animated space he created -- Elmer and Elsie burn with agency. Obviously, 
Whimsy is a quite literal take on Braitenberg -- so the connection is simpler to draw” (Daniels 
2016).
Figure 3. Valentino Braitenberg, Behavioral forms 
a and b. 
prompting them to behave. In the Whimsy experiment vehicle a’s visual sensors 
are connected to parallel actuators while vehicle b’s sensors are connected to 
opposing ones. Similar to the function of an eye, which flips images upon the 
retina to be inverted by the brain, vehicle b moves towards its visually targeted 
object - because it perceives its location correctly. Vehicle a’s parallel actuators 
obscure the bots’ perception, driving it to the left and away from the object that 
was initially caught in its field of vision. Therefore, half of the whimsies will be 
able to perceive and target a light source while the other half will perceive a light 
source, which their skewed perception will drive them away from. The behavioral 
patterns of the Whimsy bots, their interactions, and the various environmental data 
entered to manipulate them create unique relationships in each iteration of the 
experimental performance.  
Grasping Prehension  
! In a room of small autonomous robots whizzing and whirring around 
bumping into one another, hitting walls, and stopping unexpectedly before 
returning to action, one cannot avoid the sense of amusement and being caught up 
in a strange ecology. How does a Whimsy robot creature come into being? And of 
what importance does this being have in a sea of ever changing interactions 
between entities? How is a thing, a robot, - such as a one of the whimsies - formed 
through its experience of the world and what does it learn by way of an artificial 
sense of sight? In Alfred North Whitehead’s process philosophy, all matter has 
equal ontological standing in the world as the fundamental elements of the 
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universe are “occasions of experience” that when overlapped together form a 
concrete entity such as a book, flower, pencil, a human being or a robot. The 
evocative temperamental aspects of each entity are influential to the collective 
interactions that form all beings. Everything is always in the process of becoming 
and more importantly “how an actual entity becomes constitutes what that actual 
entity is... Its ‘being’ is constituted by its ‘becoming’” (Whitehead 1978; 23). For 
Whitehead “the ultimate metaphysical truth is atomism” (Whitehead 1978; 35), 
suggesting that each individual entity is both unique and separate from any other, 
while each and every atom is also a “drop of experience, complex and 
interdependent” (Whitehead 1978; 18). Occasions of experience - or the 
processual formation of actual entities - point to an interconnectedness of all 
beings whose varying interactions will continually lead to new and unforeseen 
encounters. Whimsy robots’ phenomenological experience can be viewed in this 
light too. As one bot is flipped on and propelled into the wide-open space of the 
Peterborough Art Gallery, there exists a significant number of possible outcomes 
for the way it will move and interact in the space. 
Imagine the visual sensors of a robot detecting a bright light to the left 
corner of the wide-open room. It begins to move forward towards the light. What 
separates this behavior from light-sensitive behavior of certain plants or animals? 
The machine takes in its environment causing it to act differently. One could 
imaging a Whimsy robot passing nearby the first, skewing the beam of light that it 
was following, impacting its experience of the world. Distracted, the robot may 
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stop momentarily before registering a new stronger beam of light streaming from 
an open door to its’ right. The individual entity is unique in its construction, action 
and time of entrance into the gallery though it remains dependent on the 
interconnected forces within the gallery that influence and contribute to the 
machines’ constant becoming. The whimsical experience - and all experience 
according to Whitehead’s metaphor of drops - is imbedded in an interdependent 
ecological structure. Therefore, one could argue that the network of Whimsy bots 
and other interloping factors present an ecological model that shapes and informs 
the robots’ becoming. 
! The Whimsy robots are complex beings, whose material aspects have been 
determined by Daniels while their behaviors are occasioned7 by each new 
environment that informs their becoming in the world. Whitehead’s ontology can 
be applied to an understanding of the Whimsy bots’ capacity to accumulate and be 
influenced by occasioning, as in process philosophy there is no special ontological 
condition that can distinguish experience as it is known to humans, from 
experience as a mode of becoming that applies to “the most trivial puff of 
existence in far-off empty space...”; once again, there is no human-matter 
hierarchy and “in the principles which actuality exemplifies all are on the same 
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7 The term occasioned is being employed in this context to illustrate the fact that the whimsies are 
both programmed robots developed by Daniels as well as autonomous entities that are able to 
evolve and change through their ‘experiences’ of the world around them. While these experiences 
are limited by the robots’ capacities (programming and physical components), the cybernetic 
creature is still able to change beyond its initial state and evolve over time as it exists, experiences 
and behaves in the world around it. For example, the Daniels’ Sessile pods - to be discussed later 
in this chapter - accumulate sensory data over time which will continuously affect their 
interactions with and interpretations of their environment. 
level” (Whitehead 1978; 18). In the case of this positionality, experience can be 
understood as fleeting and momentary as it is based in each unique instance of 
existence for an entity. An entity’s experience will also accumulate over time; 
every new experience altering and informing the next. All matter, regardless of its 
scale or ontological weight8 can be argued to have an experience through its 
ability to prehend. Prehension refers to “any process – causal, perceptual, or of 
another nature entirely – in which an entity grasps, registers the presence of, 
responds to, or is affected by another entity” (Shaviro 2011; 29). Thus, prehension 
is the process by which entities become occasions of experience; a multitude of 
prehensions, which overlap, appear as relations or “drops of experience, complex 
and interdependent” (Whitehead 1978; 18). Prehension implies an active and 
therefore agentic assertion of an object’s being onto another (here the object 
applies to both objects and subjects in the traditional sense that Continental 
philosophy uses them). In Steven Shaviro’s reading of Whitehead, “there is no 
hierarchy of being. No particular entity - not even the human subject - can claim 
metaphysical preeminence or serve as a favored mediator. All entities, of all sizes 
and scales, have the same degree of reality. They all interact with each other in the 
same ways, and they all exhibit the same sorts of properties” (Shaviro 2011; 29). 
As a consequence of the dismantling of subject-object hierarchies, each 
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8 This term, ontological weight, makes reference to Continental philosophy’s prioritizing the 
ontological status of organisms based on their levels of complexity. According to this model, the 
‘ontological weight’ of a human is viewed greater than the ontological weight of animals, plants, 
inorganic matter, and subsequently robots, which may have access to experience, yet in a way that 
is simplified due to its more limited capacities of perception and action.
interaction within an ecology becomes equally important to the ontological sphere 
as a whole.
! The Whimsy robots, as their prehended environment is transformed by way 
of the physical components of their sensory-actuator rerouting rules, are able to 
act and perform with/against one another similar to the ways in which sentient 
beings perform in the world around them. Their programming causes the Whimsy 
bots to experience the world in a particular way. Therefore the bots are 
transforming their own environment through experience; an experience that is 
unique to each individual entity. The objects possess lifelike qualities to which we 
can relate as human beings. This is not to say that Whimsy bots’ ability to intake 
and respond to phenomenological cues cannot be differentiated from human 
phenomenological experience. The human agent and nonhuman agent do not 
necessarily experience the world equally; what the Whiteheadian model proposes 
is the possibility that they equally have access to an experience. 
The Lure of Feelings 
! Daniels describes the functions of the machines - envisioned by their 
programmed behaviors  - as following two types of patterns. In the first group, a 
bot is programmed to act according to Braitenberg’s behavioral pattern a; with its 
sensors connected to parallel actuators. The bot programmed to follow behavioral 
pattern a intakes the visual data, which is processed through parallel actuators that 
skew its perception, causing the bot to veer off in the wrong direction away from 
the light source. The whimsy’s target is never reached; it sees another light and the 
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cycle of failed perception continues (Daniels 2015). The lure of the bots’s 
programming draws the bot towards the light and propels it to action but never the 
correct kind. This robot’s parallel actuators will never allow it to achieve its goal 
of reaching the source. The Whimsy robot is attracted to the light which it 
prehends and seeks to engage with - or at least move toward - however it is unable 
to actualize its desire. The light presents itself and then is drawn away from the 
robot, evading fulfillment or closure. For Graham Harman, contemporary 
philosopher and co-founder of the object-oriented ontology branch of Speculative 
Realism, this evasion, or what he refers to as withdrawal, is a quality inherent to 
matter. According to Harman entities do not act or decide to enter into clear 
relations. Rather, he offers a radical rethinking of ontology by focusing on the 
way that objects simply are, arguing that all entities withdraw from being fully 
present to one another. The thing is like an iceberg in that the majority of its 
qualities - physical, theoretical, historical, material, etc. - are hidden or 
withdrawn. Only a first-object-perspective can be apparent to a thing. I offer the 
term first-object-perspective as a counterpoint to the first-person-perspective, in 
order to suggest that an experience - though not homogenous in its essence - is 
accessible to different forms of human and nonhuman matter. The perspective of a 
human of thing refers to a particular attitude towards, or way of regarding, 
something; a point of view that differs across ontologies. An entity can only fully 
prehend its own existence and subjective primary experience. 
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! For Harman, the access to agency - which I will unpack further in the next 
section - is granted by the things’ inaccessibility to one another and ability to 
withdraw from full comprehension. Whitehead’s agency, I believe, similarly lies 
in the things’ ability to prehend. Prehension is assertive; though the prehended 
entity can never be fully apparent or accessed by another being, a notion that 
Whitehead and Harman share. This understanding of a mystified or opaque 
exchange between entities is negotiated by the “lure of feelings” (Whitehead 
1978; 25, 184) characterized by an attraction, allure and metamorphosis. Perhaps 
what the Whiteheadian model suggests is that the thing’s agency lies in its ability 
to draw in as well as to withdraw. I can posit that, for Harman, the agency of a 
whimsical object lies in its unknown qualities, the mystery inherent to that playful 
and mischievous thing, whereas Whitehead may insist that whimsical things’ 
agency is manifested in its ability to lure in another being without fully engaging 
with it. When approaching the thing from these two angles we may arrive at the 
same conclusion from two alternative perspectives. Both philosophers highlight 
that mercurial essence of the thing, which bubbles deep below the surface. One 
from the perspective of the object as it withdraws its molten core, the other from 
the perspective of the outsider pulling and grasping at the seeping lava as it melts 
away. What does this mean for robots, cats, ice cream cones, Judith Butler, paper 
clips and churros (to make a playful reference to OOO philosophers’ tendency to 
make quirky lists - specifically Ian Bogost’s use of the Latourian Litany [coined in 
his book Alien Phenomenology] to flatten the world of things and emphasize the 
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“bestiaries of things” (Bogost 2009))? This understanding of the underlying 
essence of objects can be used to grant them agency within the flattened 
ontological sphere. So, how do we begin? Let us attempt to rewrite the grammar 
of agency. 
An Alternate Grammar of Agency 
! According to anthropologist Alfred Gell, enchanted objects are imbued 
with agency due to their social relations. Social agency is not restricted to human 
beings or even to animate matter, “it does not matter, in ascribing ‘social agent’ 
status, what a thing (or person) ‘is’ in itself; what matters is where it stands in a 
network of social relations” (Suchman 2007; 239). The robots, or any other 
human/nonhuman actor “never really acts alone. Its efficacy or agency always 
depends on collaboration, cooperation, or interactive interferences of many bodies 
and forces” (Bennett 2010; 21). The Whimsy robots’ performative interactions are 
choreographed through each affective installation in which they take part. Each 
iteration of their performance is unique as it is construed and influenced by the 
agential aspects of the whimsies’ environment. The robots’ being depends not only 
on its material and programmed configuration but also on its interaction with other 
acting entities. The interactive interferences depend on the coming together of a 
set of elements. These elements can include the robot’s environment, the number 
of bots deployed in a given space, and/or the human-machine interactions that 
may or may not take place during the course of the Whimsy bots’ actions. Each 
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aspect of the scene of performing entities is influential and important to the 
durational outcome of such an event.
! The constellation of theoretical frameworks that has helped me in 
formulating my argument is notably situated on the de-politicized end of the 
philosophical spectrum - here I am mainly speaking to the speculative realists and 
more specifically object oriented philosophers such as Ian Bogost and the anti-
political Graham Harman; who is often critiqued for his liberal bourgeois 
positionality as he calls for the theory based in ontology that should not be 
politicized. I find particular interest in the development of critical and political 
lens that can be applied to theories of object liveliness and agency. While 
Whitehead, Ian Bogost and mainly Harman remain on the periphery of political 
commentary, feminist theorist Jane Bennett asserts herself into a larger more 
critical discourse around object agency and ‘vibrant matter’. I find it essential to 
include Bennett’s framing of objects and their agency as she positions herself in 
the center of a critical and politicized discourse to which the figureheads of object 
oriented philosophy - Graham Harman, Ian Bogost, Timothy Morton and Levi 
Bryant (frequently described by critics of the movement as a problematic ‘boys 
club’) – often only subtly allude.  
! Jane Bennett, in her turn towards vibrant materiality posits that we must 
“rewrite the default grammar of agency, a grammar that assigns activity to people 
and passivity to things” (Bennett 2010; 119). I agree with Bennett in her position 
and seek to ascribe a new understanding of agency to both human and nonhuman, 
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animate and inanimate things. Bennett coalesces affect with materiality, as two 
inseparable aspects of every thing in the world. For Bennett, affective capacity is 
established through the constant interactions between temperamental actants, – or 
matter - which can be described as their distributive agency. Distributive agency 
refers to an “agentic assemblage” or “confederation of human and nonhuman 
elements” (Bennett 2010; 21). In other words it represents a constellation of 
forces which act upon one another to create a larger effect. Bennett’s example of 
the quirky ‘federation of actants’ is the famous blackout that occurred in North 
America in 2003, affecting 50 million people. Bennett proposes the electrical 
power outage as an illustration of this distribution through the ways in which 
agency “extrudes from multiple sites or many loci—from a quirky electron flow 
and a spontaneous fire to members of Congress who have a neoliberal faith in 
market self-regulation” (Bennett 2010; 28). The scale and affective ability of the 
blackout was made possible by the scale and distribution of electricity across 
Canada and the United States and the infinitesimal number, and multiple scales of, 
actants which influence the grid’s function or malfunction. Thus a failure in the 
massive grid resulted in a crippling blackout distributed across a vast territory. In 
this analogy, all of the actors were responsible for, and essential to, the grid’s 
collapse. Thus agency is distributed across singular elements of matter that also 
form a collective whole, making reciprocity a key function to asserting oneself 
and being affected by agentic matter: “The vital materialist must admit that 
different materialities, composed of different sets of protobodies, will express 
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different powers… Humanity and nonhumanity have always performed an 
intricate dance with each other. There was never a time when human agency was 
anything other than an interfolding network of humanity and nonhumanity; today 
this mingling has become harder to ignore” (Bennett 2010; 31). We can consider 
the inclusion of objects in larger networks of social human and nonhuman 
relations through the lens of Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network-Theory, which I will 
return to later in this chapter. This interfolding of humanity and nonhumanity 
presents us with a larger framework from which to study and interpret social 
relations and events - one that includes all ‘actors’ regardless of their status as 
‘human’, ‘object’ or ‘other’.
This method of theorizing the network is represented in much of the 
robotic work to which I have referred. Works such as Ménage, Whimsy and the 
works included in the exhibition Cybernetic Serendipity present us with networks 
of technological beings that also respond to and interact with larger distributed 
networks around them, such as human interferences. Another such work is David 
Rokeby’s n-Cha(n)t, 2001, which is a community of interconnected computer 
monitors, which respond to, and augment, one another’s chatter. The viewer may 
enter into this community, becoming subsumed into a dark room of interactive 
computer screens, each presenting the viewer with the image of an ear, ready and 
waiting to listen and be heard. The large room-filling installation has been 
exhibited in a number of different locations and iterations as technology is 
adapted to ever changing contemporary standards. The version that I would like to 
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address is the 2001 installation of the work at the Walter Phillips Gallery, Banff 
Centre for the Arts (Rokeby 2010). In this edition, like the others, a community of 
computers were suspended from the ceiling as they spoke together in unison, 
speaking amongst themselves while awaiting a human interloper to enter the 
scene and activate the community in a new way, allowing for a human/machine 
engagement. The seven suspended computers ran voice recognition software that 
allowed for free-association and language generation by the machines. This 
software was run off of Mac Computers that were floating in the air - also 
suspended - above the monitor screens. Speaker sets and small microphones hung 
amongst the constellation of monitors and machines. The disembodied floating 
technological creatures appeared as haunting human figures represented only by 
images of ears and the sounds of programmed vocal responses, which were 
improvised by the computers. 
In describing the work, Rokeby claims to have felt an aspect of loneliness, 
which he admits to have likely projected onto the machine (Rokeby 2010). This 
affect inspired the artist to create a massive network of interactive ‘listening’ 
computers and allow them to act and interact in a social group while responding to 
and interacting with one another. n-Cha(n)t became a community, which 
communicated and, if left uninterrupted, would eventually sync up; chanting a 
shared stream of communication due to their continuous reading of and responses 
toward one another. Visitors had the opportunity to interrupt the synchronized 
chanting of the beings disrupting their flow of communication. The objects were 
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both agentic and submissive in that regard. Like a human in the networked system 
of the exhibition, the computers themselves had some capacity to act and change 
the interactions of that system while constrained by their physical being and 
programming capacities. 
The relationship between human and machine may be solitary. When 
observing video documentation of Rokeby’s 2001 installation one can observe the 
dark room filled with lively machines depicting disembodied ears; their human 
essence divorced from the body, representing the abstracted form of a ‘creature’ 
that was solely created for the purpose of listening. The machines may be 
comforting in their receptive depiction of the auditory sense, at the ready to 
embrace the human’s speech. n-Cha(n)t is a community of computational 
‘bodies’; an ecology of computers functioning in unison or being disrupted by 
new relations of human interference.  
n-Cha(n)t presents a unique relationship that is developed between human 
and nonhuman. The human, in this instance, holds the ability to manipulate and 
influence technology. The computers act in a way that is passive to the active 
human subject. The relation does not create a response that mimics human-to-
human interaction. Rather, as Rokeby observes, the computers offer a cold solitary 
feeling that alienates subject from object and perhaps visa versa. In this interactive 
exhibition the human remains a subject in that they control and manipulate their 
computational counterpart; the social relations, though they may exist, are 
perpetuated by the human. 
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In contrast to the interwoven community engagement presented by n-
Cha(n)t, Rokeby’s Giver of Names, 1991, presents a singular relationship between 
object and machine. Giver of Names is a computer system that is able to 
understand and respond to language in a limited capacity (compared to that of 
humans). The system is able to detect and respond to material objects, asserting 
some capacity for lively intelligence without consciousness. The installation 
includes an empty pedestal, a video camera, computer, and a video projection. As 
the camera observes the empty pedestal, an assemblage of objects is placed upon 
it. An assortment of things is observed by the machine and read through image 
processing that includes outline analysis, division of objects into separate things 
or parts, colour analysis, and texture analysis. These processes are made visible on 
a large-scale video projection, abstracting the objects to their analytic parts. This 
analytic process is linked to a database of terms describing known objects, ideas 
and sensations from which the Giver of Names will collect and display a series of 
words offered as a description for the grouping of things. This description is not 
literal but rather metaphorical (Rokeby 2010). The relationship between object 
and machine - both observing and being observed from a first-object-perspective - 
allows them to interact in an isolated and singular fashion. The machine as namer 
and the objects as recipients of a name act in a system of engagement that is 
solitary. 
In contrast to the human subject controlled n-Cha(n)t, Giver of Names 
calls on the computational device to take on the role of subject. According to 20th 
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century cultural critic and sociologist Theodor Adorno ‘subject’ and ‘object’ are 
not given categories but rather abstracted products of conceptual thought (Kiloh 
2007; 104). The classification of subject and object comes from the relations of 
power and control (closely linked to modern disenchantment which I will discuss 
in Chapter 3). Rokeby’s Giver of Names subverts this relationship as technology 
takes on the role of the subject by classifying and naming assortments of objects. 
When exploring the interactive assemblages created by machinic and 
ecological agents, and more specifically the assemblage surrounding the Whimsy 
robots, I feel it important to consider the human element(s) (not as actors holding 
the most ontological weight in the scene, but as participants/agents in the ecology) 
as they align most closely with my perspective of the world. 
Resonances and Resemblances between Human and Machine
! As the Whimsy robots scoot about the wooden floor modifying one 
another’s actions while their software routes and reroutes their movements, they 
appear as cute and accessible robots; more similar to the titular character of 
WALL-E, 2008, a cute and lovable robot, which fumbles about a deserted planet 
without posing any threat to a human observer, than the sublimely monstrous 
Decepticons from the Transformers series or mechas, known as Jaegers, from 
Pacific Rim, 2013, whose solid metal bodies stand taller than most skyscrapers 
and are outfitted with weapons that impose a lingering feeling or helplessness in 
the human viewer. The small unimposing Whimsy bots were built and 
65
programmed by Daniels as an experiment in artificial intelligence, as I mentioned 
earlier. 
! On the surface, the robots appear as objects developed for the viewers’ 
amusement with their accessible scale and anthropomorphic attributes, such as 
eyes. Daniels proposes that this anthropomorphization of his robotic creations is 
motivated by a quest to uncover a nonhuman agency. Daniels mounts eyes atop 
the machine because “[they] are strong triggers of emotional response for 
humans” (Daniels 2016). The aesthetic of giving the work ‘eyes’ is only one 
aspect of Daniels’ play with humanizing the nonhuman. He is also interested in 
the the behavioral space of anthropomorphizing objects. The actions and lively 
behaviors of his bots “present a crack into an inner world that people fill very 
fast,” Daniels “set[s] the stage so that the audience can't help but start projecting 
(anthropomorphizing) -- once that happens the language around a work can 
become very open and fluid”. When responding to human interactions with his 
work, Daniels observes that “people come to speak about their relationship with 
the work that they would not use if it was "just" technology. They speak in terms 
that are intimate and empathetic...I think it is the basis of human communication 
and it sets up a site to really think about ways we connect” (Daniels 2016). Thus 
both the aesthetic and behavioral anthropomorphizing of robotic creatures creates 
deeper, more intimate and complex relationships between human and machine. As 
such - and as we will see later in the chapter in the case of Sessile - we may feel 
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empathy towards, and a connection with, the cold, hard, mechanical body of the 
machine. 
! However, while the Whimsy bots can act for human observers in a way 
that is intimate, whimsical and exciting for the viewer, their action and interaction 
need not be perceived and mediated by humans to validate their ontological 
capacity. The anthropomorphic attributes of the machines, and the cute and quaint 
nature of their scale and design may call into question their autonomy apart from a 
human observer but these have little effect on the experiences of the robots 
themselves, in the same way that the look of an animal that appears cute to human 
perception has little anthropomorphic significance for the animal itself. 
! I am aware of the problematic aspects of assessing these objects by way of 
both anthropomorphic and object-oriented lenses, due to the two frameworks’ 
overplaying and ignoring of the significance of human actors respectively at 
times. At this point I would like to propose that the speculative evaluation of one 
entity by another requires that each thing consider the other from its first-person/
object-perspective with the knowledge that the perspectives of others may never 
be fully present to one’s epistemological reach (yet still exist). Moreover, these 
perspectives require that the entity which perceives another and assesses that thing 
through its own lens of existence, including evaluation based upon prior 
experience, embodied knowledge, etc. which will differ amongst individual 
entities. It is possible that anthropocentrism may be an entrance point, from a first-
person-perspective, to understanding similarities and differences between subjects 
67
and objects while granting all entities agency. Vital materialist Jane Bennett 
claims that: “a touch of anthropocentrism can catalyze a sensibility that finds a 
world filled not with ontologically distinct categories of beings (subjects and 
objects) but with variously composed materialities that form confederations. In 
revealing similarities across categorical divides and lighting up structural parallels 
between material forms ‘in nature’ and those in ‘culture,’ anthropomorphism can 
reveal isomorphisms” (Bennett 2010; 99). Thus drawing resonances between 
beings can simultaneously reveal their distinctions. We can assert that 
anthropomorphizing nonhuman entities does not negate their agency but rather 
can act as an entrance point to imagining their experience of the world. In a 
collective of human and nonhuman entities “an anthropomorphic element in 
perception can uncover a whole world of resonances and resemblances...We at 
first may see only a world in our own image, but what appears next is a swarm of 
‘talented’ and vibrant materialities (including the seeing self)” (Bennett 2010; 99). 
In speaking of talented vibrant materialities, the collective or swarm of beings 
becomes a crucial aspect of thing being. The whimsical entity draws its vitality 
from the multiplicity of actions and interactions into which it may enter. This 
living and engaging swarm seems to be a point of departure for many theorists 
regarding the agency of objects and becomes crucial to understanding Daniels’ 
conceptualization of the whimsies.
The Swarm
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! One of Daniels’ primary motivations when developing his work is 
fostering an aspect of ‘togetherness’ and ‘sociality’. His fascination with swarms 
(ants, fish, flocks, bacteria) stems from his background in biology. For Daniels 
“the swarms of robots I imagine are not cold -- they seek one another, not to 
dominate, but to be sustained. As Braitenberg would say, they are in 
love” (Daniels 2016). He describes Whimsy as a buzzing hive of small mechanical 
creatures that swarms around an empty room, with nothing but flashes of light to 
guide them (Daniels 2015). These things form a whimsical constellation, a 
collective unit composed of individual entities. The multitude moves in melodic 
swipes to-and-fro. A meditative quality emerges from the pulsating throng of 
robotic beings. One could just sit and watch as they move about crashing into one 
another, joining together on a similar path before diverging, though we know they 
will return together again as they flock towards an interaction that is necessary of 
the swarm.
! The swarm is a collective gathering of a mass number of entities of a 
similar type. When we understand that collectivity and interaction is an essential 
aspect of the swarm, “the task becomes to identify the contours of the swarm and 
the kind of relations that obtain between its bits” (Bennett 2010; 32). The Whimsy 
bots do not function as alienated individual things but rather, as interwoven and 
connected entities, which form and inform one another. 
! The swarm appears as a reoccurring theme in contemporary robotic art. 
Montreal based robotic artist Erin Gee offers a feminist reading of robots, which 
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puts a greater emphasis on the emotional qualities that technological beings may 
convey. Her performative installation Swarming Emotional Pianos, 2012-ongoing, 
is a collective of biosensing robots that performs in a cybernetic constellation of 
musical mechanical bodies (Gee 2014). They create a swarming body of robots 
that buzz and hum around a human body, reading its biological data and 
responding through sound. The robots create a cybernetic musical performance 
controlled by the emotions of a human at their center. The swarm buzzes around a 
human body, lying still on a simple white platform. The human body exudes 
biodata in the form of respiration, heart rate, and galvanic skin response (sweat) 
which, in turn, is read by the robots and transformed into harmonic chamber 
music corresponding to the emotional status of the human. The swarm moves 
collectively back and forth surrounding and reading the body, dancing in unison to 
the beat of the body’s emotional drum; a collective relationship between human 
and machines, woman and objects.
!  Graham Harman opposes the collective relationality of objects, viewing 
them as separate and withdrawn characters in the world. I prefer to offer a 
feminist new materialist methodology to the reading of objects in relationship to 
reciprocity, as opposed to withdrawal, that necessitates the objects’ creation and 
being. Matter is dynamic, as Shaviro asserts “no amount of information can ever 
exhaust the thing” (Shaviro 2011; 117). We could posit the existence of fully 
withdrawn and inaccessible objects (I explore this in the next chapter in relation to 
Leibniz’s monads); however, this does not negate the possibility for collective and 
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interdependent action (the reciprocity within causal relations beyond the 
metaphysical). Harman concedes, perhaps unknowingly, to the connected nature 
of objects as he states; “the world swarms with individuals” (Shaviro 2011; 104). 
The individual non-relational element remains, however; Harman’s use of the 
term swarm implies a connectivity between things that are withdrawn, such as a 
swarm of bees that buzz about together. 
! My understanding of the importance of relationality resonates more with 
feminist new materialist approaches to object oriented ontology. Though new 
materialism and object oriented philosophy share a critique of representation, they 
emerge from very different histories as OOO takes root in the rejection of 
correlationism while new materialism borrows from a lineage of feminist 
discourse. Rebekah Sheldon addresses the points of diversion between feminist 
new materialism and OOO through their unique treatments of knowledge. For 
object-oriented ontologists, epistemology is “epiphenomenal, a second-order 
representation whose range of effects is limited to human knowers” (Sheldon 
2015; 196). As an alternative, the feminist new materialist understanding of 
epistemology views it as something “with direct material consequences” (Sheldon 
2015; 196). New materialists expand the ascription of agency, as understood by 
OOO, to include non-material forces, which are equally able to change and 
influence relations in the world. Thus, for new materialists, “ideas and things do 
not occupy separate ontological orders but instead are co-constituted in the 
production of the real” (Sheldon 2015; 196). When gathered together in a 
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collective ecology, how can these material and immaterial bodies or ‘forces’ 
commingle to constitute one another’s experiences? It is through an interactive 
assemblage of biologically functioning mechanical creatures that we may seek to 
understand the experience of the nonhuman within a collective of autonomous 
pods?
Mechanical Biology
! Sessile, 2008-2011 (Fig. 4), by artist Steve Daniels, is a collective of 
sensing robotic pods, which are affected by environmental stimuli and more 
specifically, changes in their perception of ambient light. The objects function in a 
way that mimics the organisms from which they take their name. Sessiles are 
organic things, which are fixed in one place; such as barnacles, flowers and coral. 
Daniels reference to ecology in the naming of his work is reflected in its 
functioning. Like organic beings such as barnacles, the actors of Sessile form an 
interactive colony whose members respond not only to changes in ambient light 
but also to changes in the emotional status of other Sessile pods around them. The 
apparatuses of Sessile, though their function reflects a biological logic or bio-
logic, are aesthetically mechanical and robotic. Wires and the controlling “brain”9 
of the machine, a small micro-controller based hardware board, are deliberately 
exposed, making the Sessile pods appear vulnerable. The objects are obviously 
synthetic while, in contrast, their living experience and exchange of affect elicit 
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9 In this context I am not referring to a literal brain but rather a metaphor for the software and 
hardware components that control and regulate the mechanical body of the robotic creature.
sympathy, which is something that is often reserved to interactions between 
humans. Sessile expresses emotions of pain and anxiety, which are tangible and 
able to affect the human viewers’ emotional responses towards the mechanized 
objects. 
! Sessile pods share the common ability to act and react based upon their 
intake of environmental data by way of light sensors and interconnected wiring, 
which bonds all of the pods in the colony together. However, each pod will react 
uniquely to its environment. Such differences arise from a multitude of factors, 
which vary between mechanical creatures. These factors include variations in the 
objects’ data intake and experience, their orientation to the ground or height on the 
wall, as well as their internal emotional state, which is influenced by their 
accumulated responses to light.
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Figure 4. Steve Daniels, Sessile, 2008-11. Image courtesy of the artist.
! The pods are controlled by linear actuator motors, which move the 
armatures in and out, rather than a traditional rotating motor. The motor is 
controlled by a photocell sensor mounted to the front of the pod, which responds 
to light. Infrared sensors and infrared LED bulbs are mounted to the slides of the 
pods, which allow Sessile colony members to communicate their levels of stress 
amongst one another through the reception of connotative infrared light displays. 
The behavioral patterns coded into them consider the biological function of other 
sessile creatures in nature. Given that the pods are fixed to the wall - unlike 
outwardly mobile animate beings, such as dogs, birds, slugs and humans - Daniels 
thought it important to consider the formal and functional implications of 
stationary biological entities. In structuring the objects Daniels gave them radial 
symmetry, locating the arms around the object and making them move and 
contract in a radial fashion. Sessile entities in nature do not posses a back and 
front - unlike humans - but are rather radially symmetrical. This means Sessile 
pods sense data all around them and respond using their radial armatures (Fig. 5). 
! The sessiles perform biology. They are dispersed, dynamic, performative 
and topographical. Their material components are not biological (living 
organisms) but their functioning is. Each pod within the network of embodied 
performers is a unique agentic actant, which contributes to a particular outcome of 
their relations. Each of the Sessile pods has a body and brain, with the body 
composed of hardware components that have been complied into an new thing by 
the artist. The brain is a particular interpretation of hardware, which houses the 
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majority of the software program that communicates with and responsively 
controls the entire body of the machine. The body and ‘brain’ constitute one 
another through their reciprocal engagements and interactions with those around 
them, shaping the object’s embodied actions.
Inorganic Embodiment
! When turned on for the first time - in each iteration of the object’s 
installation - all of the Sessile pods’ ‘brains’ – or the machines’ software systems - 
are the same. They have the same programming and level of data information. 
Their physical components are also identical. It is due to ‘lived’ experience that 
the Sessile pods begin to differentiate themselves from one another. Their 
75
Figure 5. Steve Daniels, Sessile, 2008-11. Image courtesy of the artist.
accumulated sensory data is stored in each pod’s brain and will inform the object’s 
present and future actions, based on embodied past experience. Each pod will 
have a unique and individualized first-object-perspective during its exhibition life. 
The Sessile pod’s ability to intake information from its environment and be 
uniquely influenced by it over a period of time presents an element of autonomy 
and processual development within the machine. The sessile’s AI allows it to be 
ever evolving like Stanley Kubrick’s intelligent computer HAL from 2001: A 
Space Odyssey, likely with a much less violent outcome. 
! When one Sessile pod perceives a shift in ambient light, it will register this 
information (though its frontally located photocell sensors) and communicate the 
data to its internal brain system. The machine will simultaneously store the 
information it receives and respond to it through real time action. As the Sessile 
pods get more and more agitated due to changes in ambient lighting, their 
response will be informed by both past and present experience of their 
environment. As their sensory perception data builds up and the Sessile pods 
become more anxious, their embodied experience will be reflected through their 
responsive action - the movement of the metal armatures surrounding the Sessile 
pods’ bodies and brains. The pods will also communicate their anxiety to the 
colony through a mode imperceptible to human vision. Their unique experience of 
vision, conducted by infrared sensors, allows the colony members to communicate 
their emotions and affective states amongst themselves. Their collective 
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experience also influences and compounds each individual object’s anxieties as 
the sessiles warn one another about changes in their environment. 
! The sessiles bodies occupy space. For Jason Farman, an embodied 
experience is always a ‘spacial practice’ as he notes; “trying to imagine a body 
without space is impossible. Bodies always take up space, and, as Henri Lefebvre 
argued, are spacial in and of themselves” (Farman 2012; 19). Embodied 
experience is also associated with a body’s sensory registers of the world around 
it. I am aware that embodied experience is processed through cognitive means - 
but this is not the only mode of sensing or experiencing one’s own body. I would 
like to explore the sensory nature of embodiment (proprioception as some 
scholars call it) as it relates to the Sessile pods’ ability to sense and then respond 
to their environment. Perhaps cognition need not be the primary mode of 
experiencing embodiment. Maybe the pods’ ability to respond to the world based 
on their affective encounters with their surroundings grants them access to 
embodiment. Though we cannot be sure of the robots’ embodied experience or 
any embodied experience outside of our own we can posit that perhaps, one some 
level, their programmed responses to sensory stimuli insinuate a connection 
between the ‘brain’ and the body of the machine.
! The Sessile pods’ embodied experience of their environment is of an 
affective nature. The pods perform their experience of anxiety through the 
movement of their clamp like arms. The sessiles’ arms open and close at different 
rates depending on their levels of anxiety until the pods become so overwhelmed 
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with emotion that they go dormant or ‘play dead’ as many biological creatures 
will do in order to trick their predators into thinking they are no longer alive. After 
they recover from the experience of trauma, the pods will begin to slowly move 
and return to life.
Pre-Sensuality and the Micro-Perception
! Imagine a colony of Sessile pods lined up against a white wall of a room in 
an undistinguishable and unknowable space (Fig. 6). The space, place, and time 
do not matter to us. These are not the elements of the scene that affect us. 
Something is making us sad at the precognitive level (which bubbles up and turns 
into emotion) and then we feel pain. There is a lingering sense of unease and the 
tension in the room is palpable. Someone or something is experiencing deep 
levels of anxiety, which is obvious as it passes from thing to thing all across the 
room until it reaches us. We look at the wall of mechanical beings: an ecology of 
agents acting and interacting with one another and now us. Some of the pods are 
moving and some lay dormant. Some twitch and flutter with nervousness. They 
flash infrared light towards one another, a mode of communication, which we are 
not privy to; however, we do understand that they must be able to communicate in 
some way as the tension within each builds and then seems to expand like a wave 
crashing into the neighboring pods (Daniels 2015). Daniels built and programmed 
these creatures to insinuate the experience of anxiety at a collective, 
transcorporeal level. It is the viewer, the one who is interacting and moving 
around the machine, that causes (what may appear to us as symbolic reactions to) 
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anxiety and pain. We are meant to feel sympathy for the mechanical creatures in 
return (Daniels 2015). Each time a person passes before a section of Sessile pods 
they will see them begin to move and twitch spastically, expressing their anxiety 
caused by our presence. One may wonder what the pods are ‘feeling’.
! Sessile pods’ experience of affect is perceptible to humans through their 
responsive behaviors. Affective experience is often related to emotional 
experience although it does differ in its essence. Affect, according to philosopher 
Baruch Spinoza and his successors Henri Bergson, Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari, is characterized by embodied experience that is realized through 
different states - which, according Spinoza,  exist in three primary types: pleasure 
or joy (laetitia), pain or sorrow (tristitia) and desire or appetite (cupiditas) 
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Figure 6. Steve Daniels, Sessile, 2008-11. Image courtesy of the artist.
(Spinoza 2001; 141). Brian Massumi moves beyond this classification to further 
distinguish between affect and emotion. He similarly characterizes affective 
experience as a state of the body; however, he expands this framing to suggest that 
affect is a pre-emotional and precognitive bodily experience: a type of micro-
perception that alters the body’s capacity to act - either enhancing or diminishing - 
for a moment, which rests between the individual’s perceptible and imperceptible 
experience of embodiment (Massumi 2015). Micro-perception lies within the 
slippery ether of pre-cognitive experience prior to full perception and a fully 
actualized realization of emotion. Affective experience is not a personal or 
biographical feeling that is recognized by the embodied individual but is rather 
prepersonal (Massumi 1987; xvi). It is prepersonal in that it is not informed by the 
embodied individual’s personality or social experience of the world. Affect is a 
mode of preparation that is inherent to the body - it prepares an entity for the 
necessary reaction to the affecting stimulus. The body’s micro-perception cannot 
be fully captured by language because it “doesn’t just absorb pulses or discrete 
stimulations; it unfolds contexts” (Massumi 2002; 30). The affective response 
cannot be captured through language, as it is preconscious and prelinguistic. 
Rather, it is expressed through physical actions such as facial expressions, 
posture, respiration, etc. In other words, access to affective experience is not 
restricted to bodies with the ability to exert language to communicate.
! Massumi’s theorization of affect also highlights reciprocal interactions 
between the affected and the affecting body. The body does not experience affect 
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without the assertion of external forces onto it. Affect can also be transmitted 
between bodies: “When [a] body infolds a context and another body (real or 
virtual) is expressing intensity in that context, one intensity is infolded into 
another” (Shouse 2005). The micro-perception in this context can be compounded 
through resonating experiences of affect between bodies: “By resonating with the 
intensity of the contexts it infolds, the body attempts to ensure that it is prepared 
to respond appropriately to a given circumstance” (Shouse 2015). Thus affect, 
though it is an individual precognitive embodied experience, depends on 
reciprocal interaction between bodies. 
! The Sessile pods encounter an affective experience through their 
precognitive physical response determined by their sensory perception of the 
environment around them. The micro-perceptions registered by the pods 
(specifically light variations determine the pods’ physical reaction and an inherent 
action based in their coded performativity of ‘biological’ function), and the 
subsequent responses caused by stimuli, appear to us as a simulated act of self-
preservation. The mechanical creatures may close their arms, for example, making 
reference to animal behavior – or as prey hiding from a human ‘predator’. They 
are programmed to communicate to other pods around them by sending out alert 
signals through their infrared displays; in order to prepare the rest of the colony 
for an impending threat. According to affect theorist Patricia T. Clough “the turn 
to affect points to a dynamism immanent to bodily matter and matter generally - 
matter’s capacity for self-organization in being informational - which, [Clough] 
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want[s] to argue, may be the most provocative and enduring contribution of the 
affective turn” (Clough 2010; 207). Thus affect, as an inert prepersonal 
experience, is expressed through the coded precognitive reactions of the pods’ 
responsive bodies. Affect precedes thought and is a stable function that is 
necessitated by the Sessile pods’ development. The pods cannot stop or alter their 
actions - determined by changes in their environment - as their response is 
intertwined with their expression of, and mode of, being.
! The Sessile pods can be considered actors within a network of reciprocal 
interactivity. French Philosopher Bruno Latour theorizes actor interactivity in his 
popular actor-network-theory, which emerged during the mid-1980s and was also 
influenced by the works of Latour’s contemporaries Michel Callon and John Law. 
Actor-network-theory, also known as ANT, is a conceptual framework for 
exploring the collective sociotechnical processes, particularly in the field of 
Science and Technology Studies (Ritzer 2004). ANT is interested in the 
dismantling of binary structures such as the differentiation between science 
(knowledge) and technology (artifact) as well as between society and nature, truth 
and falsehood, agency and structure, context and content, human and nonhuman, 
and microlevel and macrolevel phenomenon (Ritzer 2004). Reciprocal 
interactions are key to the formation of actors. ANT supports relational 
materiality, which is the material extension of semiotics that suggests all entities 
achieve their essence through their relations with others. Associations, or 
reciprocal interactions, within networks provide the actor’s definition and naming, 
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granting them substance, action, intention and subjectivity (Ritzer 2004). A priori 
to the actor’s reciprocal engagement, it does not have any substance or essence; 
this is only achieved by its involvement in a network. ANT depends on the 
shifting signs and symbols, which emerge from the actor in its different networks. 
An actor may enter into multiple networks depending on its time, location, scale, 
and relationally. 
! The macro and micro scales are important to consider in these networks as 
multiple networks may intersect or overlap around and within entities. The Sessile 
pods are functioning in a multitude of relational engagements of different scales. 
At the most easily identifiable level, at least for human viewers of the work, the 
pods are incorporated into a network of interactions amongst themselves. At a less 
apparent level each pod has its own internal mechanical network, which includes - 
and controls - its ability to prehend other sessiles and become incorporated into 
the aforementioned larger network: “An actant never acts alone, its efficacy or 
agency depends on collaboration, cooperation or interactive interference of many 
bodies and forces” (Bennett 2010; 21). Similarly, “bodies enhance their power in 
or as a heterogeneous assemblage” (Bennett 2010; 23). Agency is distributed 
across an ontologically heterogeneous field, rather than being localized in a 
human body or in a collective produced only by human efforts. This distribution 
represented in Latour’s ANT is indebted to Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding 
of assemblages (Deleuze & Guattari 1993). Assemblages are temporary groupings 
of diverse matter, which present different modes and capacities of living. The ad 
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hoc nature of the assemblage is present in the sessile’s performativity due to its 
ever changing micro-perceptions and the ‘brain’ as well as the dynamic ecological 
network in the gallery, which is populated by human and nonhuman elements. It is 
in the assemblistic ecology of the gallery space (or any space that houses 
cybernetic bodies) that robots emerge as vessels capable of conveying emotion 
and behavior, as behaving entities that have a life of their own.
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Chapter 3: 
The Return of Wonder
! Enchantment is the rupture in the world that on the one side opens it up to 
! asking !and giving, on the other betrays it.
-Stephen David Ross10
! A slow, sedimentary meditation on measurement, data and documentation; 
this was the inspiration behind Steve Daniels’ creation of the Device for the 
Elimination of Wonder, 2015, (Fig. 7) hereon referred to as Device. The object is 
mechanical. Its cogs twist and turn as it is driven back and forth across a wire 
tightrope held at roughly torso level. A length of paper folds and snakes out of the 
machine before puddling on the floor beneath the device. The object is meditative; 
the slow and monotonous movements of its measurements hypnotize the viewer. 
Device’s mechanical arm swings forward and back holding a pencil, which marks 
the paper spool with lines of varying densities that represent its measured distance 
from the ground. A mass of drawing begins to form under the machine.
! Device collects data through its calculated movements and diligent 
measurements of the environment. The entire Device drives itself along two 
parallel wires that suspend its body. When it reaches a randomized location on the 
wires it stops and a bob is lowered to measure the distance between its frame and 
its environment. The metal bob attached to the trunk of Device descends toward 
the floor before being stopped by the detection of material. Initially this will be 
the floor. However, over time, as Device’s measurements are recorded and 
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10 Ross, Stephen David. Enchanting: Beyond Disenchantment. Albany: State U of New York, 
2012: 12.
expelled by the machine, as paper accumulates on the floor, the distance between 
the ground and the machine will be gradually altered. Each new recording of data 
will transform the next. As paper rolls out of the machine’s body and forms into a 
pile on the floor it will sense that its distance to the ground is diminished. This 
change will not be quick. It will occur slowly as the machine methodically draws 
and accumulates new data. 
! Device emulates the aesthetics of 19th century industrial machinery. The 
large metal structure and exposed cogs of both gold and silver hued material move 
and work together through onerous mechanical movements. The strain of the 
machine is apparent with each rotation of its drawing arm. The labored 
automatism invoked in the object’s design is reminiscent of the Industrial 
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Figure 7. Steve Daniels, Device for the Elimination of Wonder, 2015. Image courtesy of the artist.
Revolution. Device’s turning mechanical wheels and process of continuous 
printing parallel the industrial printing press, an object synonymous with the 
Enlightenment era and the demystification of the medieval epistemology in favor 
of rational and critical thought. In a sense, one can see elements of Koenig’s 1814 
steam-powered printing press reflected in Device, with the metallic cogs, curving 
metal forms, and the long sensually curved gilded bob harkening to a 19th 
century-aesthetic. This allusion to the period is also indicated in the title of 
Daniel’s work - ‘The Elimination of Wonder’ -, referring to the kind of 
demystification or disenchantment often associated with the changes brought 
about by the mechanical revolution and mass production of the printing press. 
However, Device not only emulates but also seemingly critiques the 19th century 
elimination of wonder. As information became increasingly more accessible and 
the mechanical infrastructure began to regulate society, the medieval period’s seal 
of mystique was broken and it is the sobering effects of this change that Daniels’ 
work seems to point out. 
! The disenchantment that culminated in the 19th century is written about 
extensively. Much scholarship has been dedicated to understanding the processes 
that eliminated wonder during the period (Weber 1958; Foucault 1971; Bennett 
2001). This body of writing also questions our current status as a society: are we 
maintaining the rigorous critical lens of modernity or is this framework slowly 
dissolving to make way for a re-enchantment that may still comply with modern 
rationality by celebrating a new type of ‘secular magic’ (Landy and Saler 2009)? I 
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will return to this question later but first it might help to address the drastic social 
and cultural paradigm shift that occurred between the medieval period and the 
Industrial Revolution. In The Order of Things, Michel Foucault traces the 
differences between the epistemological assumptions of the Western world prior 
to the Scientific Revolution and our modern modes of thought. For Foucault, the 
cultural climate of the 16th century was marked by intellectual and artistic 
investments in the resemblance and similitude among things (making illusion and 
metaphor central to expression) - as opposed to the post-revolutionary interests in 
difference, exactitude, measurement, and classification. Magic and metaphysics 
were valid lenses of inquiry into phenomena as were the influences believed to 
stem from (far-from-epistemological)
celestial bodies such as the planets and stars.11 Sixteenth-century knowledge, for 
Foucault, “condemned itself to never knowing anything but the same thing, and to 
knowing that thing only at the unattainable end of an endless journey” (Foucault 
1971; 34). While there was room for rational thought, it was seen at the same 
level of importance as the supernatural; and consequently, knowledge was not 
made concrete, defined, structurally sound, or classifiable: “sixteenth-century 
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11 Stars and planets were often used for analogy, one of the principle figures of similitude that 
Foucault maps in the book as being integral to the medieval episteme (the other three are 
convenientia referring to an understanding of things in relation to their resemblance to other things 
in spatial proximity; aemulatio referring to imitation by appearance; and the play of sympathies 
referring to presumed harmonius or hostile connection between matter): “For example, the relation 
of the stars to the sky in which they shine may also be found: between plants and the earth, 
between living beings and the globe they inhabit, between minerals such as diamonds and the 
rocks in which they are buried, between sense organs and the face they animate, between skin 
moles and the body of which they are the secret marks” (2005; 24).
learning was made up of an unstable mixture of rational knowledge, notions 
derived from magical practices, and a whole cultural heritage whose power and 
authority had been vastly increased by the rediscovery of Greek and Roman 
authors,” (Foucault 1971; 35). The Scientific Revolution and “the Age of Reason” 
disrupted these more ‘unstable’ modes of thought in favor of systematic modes of 
organization,12 leaving their charms and fantasies behind to prioritize difference 
over similitude. 
The Medieval period is oft characterized by its interest in games, fables, 
magic and overall a sense of whimsical enchantment that was woven through the 
cultural essence. This particular quality was inherent due to the fact that Church 
and Nobility, whose word was taken as unquestioned truth, regulated society. This 
created a cultural climate that valued fable, mystery and superstition, and has 
therefore been often viewed as a period of ignorance amongst the greater public. 
While this description of the period might be myopic in certain aspects, it 
nevertheless serves as an entry point to understanding modernity (from the 
perspectives of its most common place critiques) as the highly rational and 
“disenchanted” period that followed. The Renaissance and Enlightenment period 
saw the movement towards rational scientific critique, which expanded into the 
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12 An example of this turn towards the ordering of things could be the Linnaean Classification 
system. Carl Linnaeus devised a system for classification, which would divide all things on earth 
into seven main categories (with a multitude of subcategories under each that provides detailed 
definitions and descriptions). This system of classification was one amongst a myriad of structures 
that emerged during the scientific revolution, which according to Foucault are responsible for the 
erasure of mystified forms of knowledge (in other words, the overarching mystery) that 
characterized earlier historical periods.
Industrial Revolution when disenchantment took full hold on society. 
Secularization and the decline of magic from the end of the medieval period were 
primary sources of this change. As scholar Max Weber has noted, secularization, 
rationalities of science, bureaucracy, and the law and policy-making all 
contributed to this decline of speculative mystical thinking. 
! This modernist movement towards disenchantment - debunking of myths, 
negation of magic and deflation of similitudes - is echoed in the monotonous and 
methodical operations performed by Device. Aesthetically, the object makes 
reference to the period of the industrial revolution; specifically equipment-heavy 
and cumbersome mechanics. As a performative self-regulating being Device is 
able to eliminate wonder through its painstaking rigorous measurements and, like 
the disenchanting modernist movement, emphasizes the notion that everything can 
and should be quantified. While the machine seeks to eliminate wonder, its own 
regulatory processes project the image of a self-sustained mechanical being that 
has a whimsical or perhaps even enchanted quality as it observes and responds to 
its reality. This quality is generated by the machine’s evocation of being an 
intelligent robot, lost in its own thoughts, which frames its actions not as 
mechanical operations but as lively traits of expression; the expressive flow of 
matter (Deleuze & Guattari 1987).
Traits of Expression
! If the goal of the machine is to eliminate wonder by methodically 
measuring its surroundings, does it succeed? And for whom is the wonder being 
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eliminated? We may believe that the machine’s boundaries of existence are visible 
to us as humans; however, we do not know the perspective of a being other than 
our own. We can only speculate upon Device’s experience of the world around it, 
which it attempts to communicate through a stream of drawings cataloguing data 
in a language written by the machine. We may ask, what does the machine express 
to us? And how are these traits of expression constitutive of our own sense of self 
as we watch the self-sufficient machine perform the disenchanting and 
monotonous task of measuring and recording data?
! Device takes on the quality of a sentient creature with its lively, 
responsive, self-sustaining mode of existence. It is fascinating to watch the 
machine’s curious and quizzical behaviors. As it comes to life and then records its 
interactions, the machine becomes a cybernetic system. In comparison to a human 
body, which is controlled by a number of cybernetic regulatory systems that 
sustain breathing, cognition and movement, the Device is propelled and regulated 
by a simplified systemic form. The system that sustains Device begins with its 
initial measurement of the distance between its torso and the floor. As it measures 
and records this data through a minimalist line-based drawing and expels it 
towards the floor, Device begins to change its own surroundings. This requires a 
new measurement between its body and the floor as they grow closer together 
with the expanding pile of paper. Control and communication of the machine are 
regulated by its internal structures; its programmed desire to measure. It has been 
created to act as a quizzical and curious entity that observes and interacts with its 
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environment through a particular methodology of measuring and recording data. 
In other words, it acts and engages with the world through a specific type of 
access to being. The construction of its body and its software programming serve 
a specific purpose and circular logic.
! The sound of the machine as it whirs slowly across the metal wires which 
support it, offer the sense that the machine is purposeful and determined. The 
clicking sounds of struggle expelled by the large cog that rotates the pencil across 
paper communicate the machine’s commitment to the task of measuring its 
surroundings. With each new measurement it is as if the ‘proud’ machine expels 
its drawings before returning to check its data one more time, and then one more 
time as the growing pile of paper keeps altering the environment. The tedious 
process goes on until the machine is finally shut off.
! The work invites the viewer to imagine the machine’s motivation as it 
returns to the spot from which it initially recorded data to check its reading before 
retiring. Device methodically lowers its bob to check its measurement and to its 
surprise, the environment has shifted! This imagination animates the machine; 
increasingly, it looks like a bewildered scientist lost in her own calculations and 
questions: have I moved closer to the ground or has the ground moved closer to 
me? Device, perhaps not knowing how to respond, continues its cycle of recording 
in order to catalogue its experience of the world around it. Though the scope of 
the machine’s observation is limited, its ambition to collect data and catalogue its 
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experience is strong. Its thirst for measurement will never be satiated as each 
measurement necessitates the next.
! The machine’s body expels the long winding cable from a spool connected 
to the underbelly of Device, ever so slowly lowering a gilded bob towards the 
floor (Fig. 8). As the ground stops the bob, the measurement of its length is 
processed by the computer and expressed through a line drawing on paper. The 
length of paper - a physical recording of the machine’s experience - is expelled 
from the machine; it lies gathered in a heap on the floor. As the length of paper is 
spit out of the machine’s body and onto the floor it communicates its own traits of 
expression. For Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, traits of expression describe the 
matter-flow that is not reducible to corporeality even if they are ascribed to a 
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Figure 8. Metal bob and paper expelled from Device, 2015. Image courtesy of the artist.
physical body. A body may flow through different traits of expression dependent 
on its state thus, "matter-flow can only be followed" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 
409). In order to explore the types of flowing undulating bodies that Deleuze and 
Guattari describe we can look to one of their oft-cited examples of lively 
transformations, metal. Many scholars have explored the vivid living qualities of 
matter (such as Karen Barad’s agential realist exploration of matter that makes 
reference to rocks and crystals and Jane Bennett’s interest in ‘vibrant matter’) 
presenting the vibrancy of both mobile and (seemingly) immobile bodies. Deleuze 
and Guattari find particular interest in expressiveness of metal in the 
“Nomadology” section of A Thousand Plateaus as they posit how the material 
expresses itself to the metallurgist through undulating bodies of liquid and solid 
metal. We can look to the material, in all of its potential forms (liquid, solid, etc.) 
as an expressive medium. Metal provides an example, in Jane Bennett’s reading of 
Deleuze and Guattari, for establishing a theory of material vitalism:
Let us return to the example of the saber, or rather of crucible steel. It 
implies the...melting of iron at high temperatures and...the successive 
decarbonations but corresponding to these singularities are traits of 
expression-not only the hardness, sharpness and finish, but also the 
undulations or designs traced by the crystallization and resulting from the 
internal structure of the cast steel...Each phylum has its own singularities 
and operations, its own qualities and traits, which determine the relation of 
desire to the technical element (the affects the saber ‘has’ are not the same 
as those of the sword)...At the limit, there is...a single machinic phylum, 
ideally continuous: the flow of matter-movement, the flow of matter in 
continuous variations, conveying singularities and traits of expression 
(Bennett 2015; 226).
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Here, what Bennett wants to draw attention to is the uniqueness of the way metal 
responds to being heated by expressing operations that are specific to its internal 
structure. This formulation frees the concept of expression from the limitations of 
subjectivism (Massumi 2002). The endeavoring body of Device can be understood 
as expressing itself too, not only through the operations of its metallic and 
mechanical construction composed of cogs (referencing a 19th century aesthetic 
with exposed wiring celebrating the inner functions and technological 
construction of the machine), but also through the line drawings it traces. The 
mound of paper populated by them, as with the markings on crystallized cast 
steel, represent a visual sign of the active nature of the machine. The mass of 
paper is not dormant but rather presents a narrative of the machine’s existence and 
its experience of the world; a gestural drawing that expresses the machine’s 
experience.  
! On a macrocosmic scale we can understand the Device as expressing some 
form of agency through its traits of expression; Deleuze and Guattari’s 
preoccupation with metal’s expressive traits stem from their interest in Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz’s monadology and discussion of substances. Leibniz’s theory of 
monads, his best-known contribution to metaphysics, offers a definition for 
substance. Monads are elementary particles, the fundamental elements of the 
universe, which are not fully apparent or accessible to one another. They are 
eternal, indecomposable, individual, subject to their own laws, and un-interacting; 
each reflects the entire universe in harmony. Leibniz asserts that monads are 
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centers of force - or substance - as opposed to space, matter, and motion, which 
are only phenomenal. The monads are not linked to or reserved for our sensory 
perception of the world around us. We cannot see, smell, taste, or touch monads - 
they exist without being perceptible to us. The monad is invisible and indivisible; 
it has no parts and is not located in a particular visible aspect of matter. 
! Unlike atoms, monads do not extend beyond themselves to create larger 
units. This is because for Leibniz space is an illusion. The monad is “pregnant 
with the future” and “laden” with the past (Leibniz 1898; 22). Like the autopoietic 
machine the monad is a closed entity that is self-informing, self-regulating and 
autonomous. Imagine the streaming folds of paper that lay beneath Device. 
Similar to the folds and entanglements of the lengths of paper, the monads 
become holders of folded streams of past and future. They are carriers of essences 
that are exposed and unfolded only when they have sufficient reason to do so, like 
the paper which can be unfolded when one wants to read Device’s recorded 
narrative of its surroundings. The monad is extremely complex. The properties of 
each monad, which becomes a metaphor for self-contained entities later in the 
writing of Deleuze, include all of its relations to every other monad in the 
universe. Thus the monad is self-sufficient, having all of its properties within 
itself. The monad does not depend on relations; it is discreet and has an aspect of 
transcendence from human knowledge. 
!  Now let us return to Deleuze and the undulating flowing matter-body as it 
unfolds its traits of expression in order to explore the self-contained monad as the 
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fractal elements of the universe in all their complex relations. In his last major 
work The Fold, Deleuze foregrounds Leibniz’s fractured universe of monads as 
they weave and fold amongst one another. This baroque conception of matter - 
characterized by the billowing layers and folds of baroque fabrics, and designs 
composed of smaller and smaller parts that spiral on infinitesimally - illustrates 
the flowing body as it changes states and traits of expression (Deleuze 1993). 
According to Deleuze’s reading, “Leibniz’s most famous proposition is that every 
soul or subject (monad) is completely closed, windowless and doorless, and 
contains the whole world in its darkest depths, while also illuminating some little 
portion of that world, each monad, a different portion. So the world is enfolded in 
each soul, but differently, because each illuminates only one little aspect of the 
overall folding” (Deleuze 1990; 157). While a monad may be pregnant with a 
multiplicity of expressive traits only a number of such traits may be actualized or 
‘illuminated’ at a given time. Like the metal in its soft liquid state, compared to 
that same metal hardened and formed into a sword, the monad (that represents all 
things in itself) may only be actualized in a particular form at a time. The infinite 
unfolding of the monad and its complex wealth of traits spill out and hug in to the 
compressed bodies of time and space. Each holding a self-sustained universe. A 
single self-sustaining thing. A closed system that can open its self up at will. 
Programmed Desires
! In a sense, Device (Fig. 9) operates inside a closed system. It exists for, 
and is informed by, its own programmed desire to measure and record its 
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environment. While it measures it also shapes its own experience without the 
provocation or necessity of any outside forces to interfere upon it. Device 
participates in its own closed network, thus the machine is autopoietic. 
Autopoietic machines are generative. The machine is able to reproduce itself. 
Their reproduction - of their own conditions, expressions, and materiality - 
transcends their original construction at the hands of a human agent (or maker). 
Autopoietic machines are closed, self-regulating systems that continuously spawn 
and specify their own bodies in an endless loop of creation; such as a living cell 
that produces its own components, continuously using them to manufacture more. 
The piling paper, which influences Device’s operation, has a determining power 
on the next components that it will produce. For primary autopoiesis scholar 
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Figure 9. Steve Daniels, Close up of Device, 2015. Image courtesy of the artist.
Humberto R. Maturana and his collaborator Francisco J. Varela, an important 
characteristic of the autopoietic machine is that it produces and is affected by its 
construction. They also tell us that autopoietic machines are autonomous, as they 
function independently of intervening relations; they are self-contained and 
monadic yet they are unities, because they operate within their own constructed 
boundaries in a processes of self-reproduction, and finally they are constant in 
their self-regulating actions.
! Device’s physical being and the autopoietic system that self-regulates its 
actions limit the machine’s engagements with its environment. It becomes bound 
and confined to its own impulse to measure and record. However, considering that 
its desires are programmed adds another element (a two-tier problem) to its 
construction. On one hand, the machine is a product of human design, in this case 
the artist Steve Daniels, which potentially implicates him in the system and 
troubles Device’s self-contained appearance if not the word desire itself. On the 
other hand, the notion of desire is often characterized in ways that are specific to 
human emotive and cognitive capacities. As I have argued earlier, a machine may 
be able to experience precognitive and pre-emotional affect as this does not 
require human abilities. Therefore we can speculate that perhaps the machine is 
compelled by a desire, which we can define in this case as the motivation to 
perform a specific task - that of measuring and recording - that it will continue to 
follow until it is somehow stopped by interference in the closed system. To return 
to the question of the human programmed autopoietic machine, Maturana and 
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Varela assert that autopoietic machines can be thought of as living systems. This is 
in part due to their self-sufficient and autonomous nature. Their assertion is quite 
bold due to the fact that they claim both human and nonhuman systems can be 
living. While nonhuman systems, such as a self-sufficient bot, may appear as 
lively, we know that this liveliness does not prescribe to the philosophical 
perspectives that make a distinction between organic and inorganic matter when 
defining life. In Maturana and Varela’s formulation, the machine - regardless of 
being manufactured by a human creator - remains dynamic and vibrant even if it 
is mechanical and technological (as opposed to biological). Liveliness is often 
associated with unpredictability and behavioral qualities reserved for autonomous 
biological beings - as Maturana and Varela identify: “living systems are a priori 
frequently viewed as autonomous, ultimately unpredictable systems with 
purposeful behavior similar to ours” - while the self-regulating autopoietic 
machine may be characterized by its “completely known deterministic properties 
which make [the machine] at least conceptually, perfectly predictable” (Maturana 
& Varela, 83). Maturana and Varela observe that machines do not need to be 
unpredictable in order to be vibrant and evocative as, “the beauty of life is not a 
gift of its inaccessibility to our understanding,” but rather the living machine can 
be both predictable and dynamic (Maturana & Varela, 83). The predictability 
imposed by the machine’s programming does not negate its individual modes of 
expression and whimsicality. It is still performative, engaging and lively in its pre-
conceived autopoietic existence. The fact that Device’s desires have been 
100
programmed by a human to perform a predictable and self-sufficient action does 
not negate its status as a kind of lively system. Rather, the fact that the 
programmed motivations of the machine create an autopoietic system makes the 
machine a living one. Device, controlled by its programming, registers a lively 
capacity within its own material and immaterial limitations. Let us now step 
outside of the autopoietic system of the living machine to consider our own role, 
as humans participating in the ‘life’ of the machine.
The Human Observer
! A crowd begins to form in the outer rim of the Museum of Vancouver’s 
labyrinth maze of rooms; a nearly empty room that looks like it is still under 
construction. Perhaps the museum is coordinating a new installation, but that we 
do not know. We approach the crowd with curiosity; whatever they are looking at 
must be thrilling. As we draw closer we begin to crane our necks in an attempt to 
see over top of the collective of individuals blocking our view. A couple steps 
away, and moving towards the next room, we take our chance to push forward 
into the crowd. From the crowd emerges a mechanical object (Fig. 10). The object 
moves slowly across a tight rope before lowering a bob towards an overflowing 
pile of paper on the floor. The pile of paper has accumulated over a period of six 
weeks in which the machine was on and functioning each day during the open 
hours of the Museum of Vancouver. Cogs creek and strain against the labour of 
the device moving its own heavy body back and fourth as though its performance 
may never stop. The exposed wiring of the machine, each click of its intricate 
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mechanics, and every turn of its wheels make apparent its struggle in completing 
the task of measuring and cataloguing its slowly changing ecology, now populated 
by human observers that it seems to ignore. 
! We see something on the floor. Thin reels of paper lay in a swirling 
entangled pile. It is hard to tell where the length of paper begins, which mark was 
the first mark made by Device? We can see the progression of time and the 
changing environment as it is catalogued in the thicker and thinner lines drawn on 
the page. Thick aggressive lines fill nearly an entire section with solid black 
markings. These sections lay near the bottom of the billowing pile of paper as 
they indicate a further distance between Device and the ground. Towards the top 
of pile we can see wispy, though completely straight and methodical, lines that are 
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Figure 10. Steve Daniels, Device installed at the Museum of Vancouver, 2015. 
Image courtesy of the artist.
thin and ever so lightly filled in. These lines indicate that the pile’s height has 
grown and Device has catalogued the approaching mound as it grows nearer to its 
body. The actions of the machine are constant and unwavering. Its mission to 
catalogue is clear and its execution is single-minded. 
! According to Daniels, the machine was developed as an experiment in 
slow sedimentary meditation on measurement and data. A question emerges from 
this endeavor. Who is this meditative experience being conducted for and who is 
actually experiencing it? The machine has been developed to function in a closed 
system. It influences and acts for itself. Perhaps, for it, the experience of 
measuring the environment is somehow meditative in that it appeals to the robot’s 
programmed software. We can only speculate that the action of measurement 
functions to satisfy the robot’s engrained need to catalogue, that this does 
something for the machine - whether that offers some kind of satisfaction or 
reward we may not know.13 We might also be able to assume that this meditative 
robot was developed with the experience of a human in mind. 
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13 We can look to the research of scientist George Musser who writes about the potential for self-
awareness within machines and mechanical devices. He posits that machines could possibly 
already have developed minds; of which we may be unaware. He believes that minds perhaps exist 
outside of human corporeal experience in the realms of networks that can achieve a ‘group-level 
consciousness’. It could be that - because A.I. is outside of the human experiential realm - 
machines have become self-aware without us knowing. What signs prove that a being is 
conscious? Musser points to the fact that, if machines have gained a mind, intelligence or 
consciousness, they “might not be able - or want - to participate in the classic appraisals of 
consciousness such as the Turing Test”. This leaves us with many more questions regarding the 
machines access to life, knowledge, intelligence and feelings such as desire or satisfaction (Musser 
2016).
! Daniels embraces the consideration of a human viewer in the development 
of his robots. As an artist, he creates work that will appeal to human empathy in a 
way that draws us into the machine. In the case of Device for the Elimination of 
Wonder we might question Daniels’ interest in developing such a pedantic 
machine. It is not clear if this machine is in fact eliminating wonder as its intricate 
wiring and mechanical body produce remarkably specific and, in my opinion, 
enthralling actions in and upon its surroundings. In contrast to his earlier works 
such as Whimsy and Sessile, Device seems to conduct an entirely new form of 
experience in the world around it; one that is solitary and autopoetic. Unlike 
Whimsy, robots that whirr around an open room bumping into one another and 
directing each other’s actions and Sessile’s scared and shuddering pods, the 
Device may appear mundane in comparison. 
!  Daniels is markedly empathetic in his approach to producing robots, from 
his small and cute Whimsies to the shy and struggling Sessiles and to Device, 
whose monotonous labour appeals to the human experience of, and sometimes 
hatred for, repetitive work. The viewer is able to adopt the perspective of Device 
by reflecting on the confined structures of labour as well as the monotonous act 
that is unceremoniously put on display. Empathy is known to increase humans’ 
desire to help others, though Device’s autopoietic system does not allow for 
interference. The human interloper is relegated to the outer recesses of the scene 
as a spectator who cannot offer aid to the hard-working machine. While empathy 
is oft associated with an exchange of emotions - between humans - this exchange 
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between human and machine does not require a parallel experience to be affective. 
The spectator can be moved by the machine regardless of whether the machine 
has an emotive capacity or not. The robots ongoing labour can inadvertently affect 
the viewer. While this experience is more sympathetic, the viewer may also 
experience other emotions triggered by the machine; such as terror, fear, 
amusement, fascination, and admiration. etc. 
The machine is relegated to the compliant performance of a small number 
of repetitive tasks. Its programming regulates the machine to compliant worker, 
securing the human’s position as top of the ontological food chain. I would like to 
veer off on a tangent for a moment in order to consider the iconic film trope of the 
predictable and compliant programmed machine turned autonomous. In this trope, 
self-regulating machines appear at times humorous and friendly, and other times 
violent and volatile. Many science fiction films depict robots that produce a 
lingering sense of unease as they threaten to revoke their monotonous repetitive 
actions in order to turn on their human makers at any point. Even a nonviolent 
machine can present a threat when it becomes subsumed into its objective of 
carrying out a monotonous human programmed task like the machinery in the 
Geonosis droid foundries seen in Star Wars: Episode II Attack of the Clones. 
Though not intentionally menacing, the factory machines’ processes of producing 
clone droids present a series of deathly obstacles for the characters Anakin 
Skywalker and Padme Amidala. The massive machines punch through metal as 
they threaten to perform the same actions on a human body. Perhaps the 
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programmed machine is able to instill a sense of fear or unease through its 
foreshadowed imposition of a potential to break from its imposed functioning and 
become free. This could perhaps be why one becomes so enthralled with the 
routine actions of Device as they await its departure from normal function. Robots 
in film may also allude to possibility that man-made technological assistants may 
acquire singularity; such as the adorable trash compactor bot WALL-E (2008) or 
the much more horrifying examples of I, Robot’s (2004) humanoid slaves who 
turn vengent upon their masters; Ex-Machina’s (2015) Ava, who turns deceptive 
and self-aware before completely adopting a fleshy body and blending seamlessly 
into the human world; or Chappie (2015), programmed mechanized police droid 
who is stolen and re-programmed to think and feel for himself. 
! I would like to consider another source for the viewers’ enchantment with 
the routine functions of the machine. In his study of hyper-objects, object-oriented 
ontologist Timothy Morton mentions the way we “marvel at the way [things 
like]...syrup lugubriously slimes its way out of a bottle... But to a hypothetical 
four-dimensional sentient being, such an event would be an unremarkable static 
object, while to a neutrino the slow gobs of syrup are of no consequence 
whatsoever. There is no reason to elevate the lava lamp fluidity... into the 
archetypical thing” (Bennett 2015; 230). For Morton, the intricacies of things such 
as the slow slimy slithering of syrup may be exciting and important to some, 
while to other viewers of the gooey material the syrup has no importance 
whatsoever. In other words, human perception or interpretation of a thing’s 
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meaning and significance is only one among many, characterized by our own 
programmed desire (genetic hardwiring) to make sense of the world.  
! In response to Morton’s musing on beings’ interests in syrup, Jane Bennett 
proposes that while “perhaps there is no reason to do so-if, that is, that we are in 
fact capable of transcending the provincial pro-human-conatus perspective from 
which we apprehend the world. If we are not, then a good tack might be to stretch 
and strain those modes to make room for the outlooks, rhythms and trajectories of 
a greater number of actants, to, that is, get a better sense of the ‘operating system’ 
upon which we humans rely” (Bennett 2015; 231). The syrup, like the slow 
unwavering and undulating measurements of Device (Fig. 11) present us with 
phenomena that can provoke our philosophical inquiry into being (human and 
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Figure 11. Steve Daniels, Close up of Device, 2015. Image courtesy of the artist.
nonhuman). If we wish to understand humans in relation to multiple ontological 
starting points, we must try to depart from our wholly anthropocentric perspective 
and consider the entire ‘operating system’ of which we are a very small part. 
Device’s self sustaining actions that we can observe from outside of the closed 
loop in which it participates make one aware of the potential of vitality in all 
things. The system is never fully closed. Device depends on a multitude of forces 
which act with and upon it just as we humans depend on a great number of actants 
which Bennett draws our attention to as she explains;
! I find myself living in a world populated by materially diverse, lively 
! bodies. In this materialism, things - what is special about them given their 
! sensuous specificity, their particular material configuration, and their 
! distinctive, idiosyncratic history - matter a lot. But so do the eccentric 
! assemblages that they form. Earthly bodies, of various but always finite 
! durations, affect and are affected by one another. And they forms noisy 
! systems or temporary working assemblages that are, as much as any 
! individuated thing, loci of effectivity and allure (Bennett 2015; 233).
Through this image of the world around us - presented through a system of all 
diverse matter - we can understand how object agency can play a vital role in 
shaping our understanding of interactions between human and nonhuman entities. 
The Device, which performs its mundane actions, lures us into its meditative state 
of measurement, while around it (and us) a host of system factors, or ‘eccentric 
assemblages,’ form and help to conduct its (and our) being. This opens Daniels’ 
Device to interpretation as a work that gestures towards a re-enchantment of the 
world through engagements with object agency while critiquing the very 
modernist discourse of disenchantment itself. 
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The Beginning and End of Wonder 
! When looking at Device for the Elimination of Wonder we can understand 
its basic functions. We see that it moves back and forth across the length of wire 
until it stops in order to measure its distance from the floor or later from the top of 
a pile of measurement drawings. We also know that it is a work of art, which is 
communicated to us by its context. It is located in the Museum of Vancouver as a 
temporary installation, one work amongst a series of interventions, which have 
become interlopers in the museum. Device has been curated into the space by 
Caroline Langill and Lizzie Muller for the Lively Objects exhibition in 
conjunction with the International Symposium on Electronic Art (ISEA) 2015 in 
Vancouver, British Columbia. A didactic panel on the wall informs us of the name 
of the work and that it is a temporary intervention for the Lively Objects 
exhibition. We are also told that Device is a “simple kinetic system obsessed with 
quantification, it is ultimately a feedback-loop manifesting itself as a 
machine” (Langill and Muller 2015; 123). This much we know, however there is 
still much information about the object, its functioning, purpose, and design that is 
not apparent to us. Whether Daniels’ motivation was to create an object that 
completely eliminated wonder or to bring wonder back to the 21st century psyche 
is left to the viewer. 
! In his reading of Whitehead's process philosophy, Steven Shaviro proposes 
that wonder is inherent to philosophical inquiry and even more essential to 
speculative realism. Wonder can be characterized in a multitude of ways; 
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however, I would like to be specific in categorizing my understanding of the 
phenomenon. Wonder is a feeling of uncertainty or questioning that is incurred 
when confronted by an engaging thing. For Whitehead “If philosophy begins in 
wonder and ends in wonder then...its aim should be not to deduce and impose 
cognitive norms, or concepts of understanding, but rather to make us more fully 
aware of how reality escapes and upsets these norms” (Shaviro 2011; 67). 
Whitehead’s notion of philosophical inquiry frames his interest in process 
philosophy and the consideration of an existence outside of that employed by 
humans. As he proposes, we need not develop a theoretical framework for 
experience and cognition that transcends all being in the world but rather we can 
become aware that there is no singular mode of being and experience, and instead, 
rocks, ice cream, Stanley Kubrick, an iPhone and Device for the Elimination of 
Wonder can all have access to their own unique existence. For Shaviro “this is 
why any true realism must be speculative” and therefore, “we must think outside 
of our own thought, and we must positively conceive the existence of things 
outside of our own conceptions of them” (Shaviro 2011; 67). For Shaviro and 
Whitehead alike we need to be able to consider existence outside of our being, 
which is precisely the purpose and wonderment of philosophical inquiry. As of yet 
we are unable to quantify or experience the existence of entities outside of our 
own embodied experience, however we can consider the life of Device - its 
methodical movements, provocation towards constant measurement, ability to 
draw, etc. - through speculative theory.
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! While some may consider the banal processes of measurement to be the 
antithesis of liveliness or agency, the object’s apparent struggle provides the 
viewer with a feeling of empathy that grants a lively quality to the object. While 
the task performed by the object is uninspiring, the drawings it produces, the 
method by which it categorizes its environment, and the uncanny quality 
presented by a behaving machine all point to a wondrous inner life of the object. 
The object is engaged in an act of play with its components and the environment, 
through measurement, and with others through its physical movements and 
performativity in front of the viewer. The object expresses individual traits as it 
engages in the activity of measuring its surroundings from a particular vantage 
point and embodied experience of the world around it. The act of measuring is 
recreational in this instance in that it technically does not serve a serious or 
practical purpose - such as measuring the distance of a body of land in order to 
allocate its resources to a particular individual. This gives the actions of the robot 
an element of play, however banal we may consider it, and represents a whimsical 
quality within the machine. The quizzical being is obsessed with the play of 
collecting data. Device is interested in the site that it inhabits and uses its 
embodied actions of play - buzzing about on suspended wires, dropping a bob to 
measure its environment and sketching the data that it collects - creating a visual 
narrative of experience for the viewer. A viewer can observe that the object is 
fixed within a system of behaviors that dictate its experience of the world insofar 
as there exist no outside forces to affect the object’s life. A viewer may also 
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disrupt this fixed system by engaging in play with the object, though this may not 
be advised in the context of a museum. One might be able to interfere in the 
robot’s methodical gameplay transforming its initiative from a one player to two-
player game.
! An interloper might play with the machine by interrupting or altering its 
methodical measurements. One could place their hand beneath the bob at a unique 
height that will alter the machines embodied experience through its inability to 
differentiate between the ground, a pile of paper or a human’s hand. This can be 
understood as an act of agency by the human hand onto the machine. Where does 
agency come into play from the perspective of the machine? We may understand 
the formulation of agentic machines through Andrew Pickering’s framework of 
material agency as it applies to the agency presented by a multiplicity of matter 
including mechanical nonhuman bodies. Pickering’s theory operates through the 
lenses of both scientific and philosophical inquiry (he refers to scientific practice 
as ‘the mangle’ a term that connotes the intersections and mergers between 
history, philosophy, social studies and science) as he supposes that science is 
performative rather than representational. In this “performative image of science, 
scientists interact with, rather than merely observe, phenomena, whose “material 
agency is irreducible to human agency,” while also being constitutive of it 
(Pickering 1995; 54). Even the human-made machine expresses agency in a 
capacity apart from the human maker; “scientists, as human agents, maneuver in a 
field of material agency, constructing machines that...variously capture, seduce, 
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download, recruit, enroll, or materialize that agency, taming and domesticating it, 
putting it at our service, often in the accomplishment of tasks that are simply 
beyond the capacities of naked human minds and bodies” (Pickering 1995; 7). In 
other words, human and nonhuman actors interplay and intertwine in their 
construction, performance and production; all acting in their own unique agentic 
capacities. Device has the ability to express its agency through multiple channels. 
We can understand that the object, while measuring its environment may also act 
upon its environment. Device measures a changing landscape which it itself is 
changing through the act of measuring and dispensing data drawings. Device is 
also able to express its agency through its ability to generate a self-sustaining 
archive of data. The being is able to gather and then assert data onto others 
through drawings. Finally, the object expresses its agentic capacity through its 
ability to engage others. The meditative actions of the machine are whimsical in 
that they inspire interest, questioning, and interpretation. The machine, which 
engaged my interest and provoked this writing, has expressed its agentic capacity 
through its ability to attain an audience and generate a wealth of questions 
surrounding its purpose, functioning and experience of being. 
A World Without Us
! It is nearing the end of the day for the many employees, gallery attendants, 
janitors, monitors and security guards working at the Museum of Vancouver. Only 
a handful of visitors remain in the museum aside from all of the workforce who 
are required to remain in the museum until all of the lights have been turned off 
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and the doors locked. The room that has become home to Device for the 
Elimination of Wonder is deserted. The gallery goers have all made their way 
towards the exit and are in the process of picking up their parcels and coats. So 
what is taking place inside the museum, apart from human interaction or 
spectatorship? We can imagine quite definitively that Device is still performing. It 
continues to struggle and strain across the parallel cables that suspend it in air 
inside the gallery. It continues to measure its environment. And it continues to 
draw line images representing data it collects as it acts and interacts with the space 
around it. Shaviro’s reading of Eugene Thacker’s nihilistic and pessimistic 
philosophy stipulates that “it is not enough to just consider the (objective) world-
in-itself in its difference from the (subjective) world-for-us. We must also actively 
explore what Thacker calls the world-without-us: the world insofar as it is 
subtracted from, and not amenable to, our own concerns. We learn about the 
world-for-us through introspection and the world-in-itself through scientific 
experimentation. But we can only encounter the world-without-us obliquely, 
through the paradoxical movement of speculation” (Shaviro 2011; 67). 
Considering Thacker’s view of the nonhuman perspective we can posit the 
experience and existence of Device whether we are standing in a room with it or 
we imagine its continued existence without us - with the underlying implication 
that while this object might have been created by humans it is already also 
entangled within a web of other, nonhuman factors that impart upon its existence.
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! How does the object exist outside of human interference? The object exists 
to perform a task that has been encoded into its behavioral system. Device’s 
purpose, outside of the human and for itself, is the quantification and collection of 
data. We can “obliquely” read the goal of the machine to pose a philosophical 
question that will pertain to both the human and nonhuman. What does the 
quantization or categorization of the machine’s experience have to do with our 
understanding of history or temporality in an increasingly digitized age? As the 
past is virtualized, history is converted into material (or immaterial data) that is 
read and experienced by computational technologies - as opposed to the written 
word which is understood and relayed by humans - “erasing the material and 
cultural differences that constitute the differential rhythms of temporal 
experience” (Munster 2006; 94). As computational technologies proliferate and 
information is translated to computer-based communication through programming 
languages, which are designed specifically to prioritize objects such as object-
oriented-programming (OOP), it may become easier for us to consider an 
existence outside of the world-for-us model problematized by Shaviro and 
Thacker. Device’s physical production of drawings, which may mean more to it 
than to us, and function as a catalogue of experience, can perhaps draw us closer 
to understanding that there exists an ontology outside of our own. 
! The knowledge of nonhuman agency can enable us to develop a curatorial 
methodology, which considers robotics as evocative (and lively) entities and 
acknowledges their repetition, habits and behaviors. The activation of the object’s 
115
functioning and their scope of opportunity and action may be used as a method of 
inquiry to explore human/nonhuman relations through Speculative Realism. This 
method might also find application outside the curatorial discipline, with robotics 
being employed as an accessible access point to consider ethical, environmental, 
aesthetic, and political implications of our human-centrism. Sherry Turkle 
describes the computational object as evocative due to its ability to raise new 
awareness about the potential of aliveness in nonhuman beings (Turkle 1984). 
Using the example of a children’s fascination with behaving objects such as 
robots, we can employ this methodology as an entry point to posit the agency of 
objects that do not always express themselves in ways that are obviously legible 
to us as lively behavior.
Re-Enchanting the Machine
! Where does this leave us in relationship to disenchantment and the 
‘elimination of wonder’? Through the elimination of enchantment during the 
Industrial Revolution we were left the modernist celebration of industry, 
rationality and grand narratives. Post-modernism saw the dismantlement of 
unified narratives in favor of pluralism and incompleteness; celebrating irony and 
social/political criticism. Today, have we seen a return to wonder? In relationship 
to modernism, post-modernism and the illusive post-post-modernist (any many 
other sub-categorical) movements where do we stand? Though there is little 
literature exploring the ‘metamodern’ era I would like to propose this as one 
possible movement that could explain, and be used explore, our contemporary 
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condition. In the Metamodern Manifesto of 2011 Luke Turner proposes that the 
metamodern is: “the mercurial condition between and beyond irony and sincerity, 
naivety and knowingness, relativism and truth, optimism and doubt, in pursuit of a 
plurality of disparate and elusive horizons” (Turner 2011). So what lies between 
irony and sincerity, naivety and knowingness, relativism and truth, optimism and 
doubt? I am interested in this ‘in-betweenness’ in relationship to the robotic 
objects presented in this thesis and my probing into the question of wonderment. 
At “Navigating the Metamodern” The 15th Annual York University Art Histories 
Graduate Symposium on March 19th 2016 I presented my research in relation to 
the metamodernist turn. The theoretical underpinnings of this thesis were 
commonplace at the conference as graduate students spoke of affect, Speculative 
Realism, Object Oriented Ontology and vibrant matter in relation to distant and 
disparate fields of research that all found their common relations through the 
celebration of the nonhuman, the mystical, the magical and the surreal. Nods to 
both sincere and ironic perspectives permeated the conference as critical subject 
matter was often explored through humor and pop-culture references. ‘Kanye-
esque’14 perspectives on critical art historical practice were explored as - like the 
iconic celebrity’s oft exploitative, controversial and larger than life displays of 
performance that linger of the cusp of reality and fantasy, genuineness and 
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14 The term ‘Kanye-esque’ references the iconic contemporary celebrity Kanye West and is used to 
connote the essence of his often subversive, grandiose performances, political and social 
criticisms, and most specifically (in relation to the metamodern) his spectacular cultural presence 
due to his actions (performative, political, artistic, etc.) that are often simultaneously ironic and 
sincere (or indistinguishable from both irony and sincerity).
falsehood, criticism and humor - the metamodern condition celebrates 
simultaneity and the adoption of lenses that may criss cross, mingle and diverge in 
certain instances but can still be held in unison. In oscillating between 
perspectives in a liminal space these human and nonhuman, animal and 
mechanical, cold and biological, lively and robotic mechanisms may be celebrated 
for their reintroduction of wonder; a re-enchantment of the machine.
Conclusion 
! In order to conclude this body of research, I would like to point towards 
new areas of inquiry that the line of thinking and questions about robotic art posed 
in this thesis might lead us in the future. The project has gleaned perspectives 
from various theoretical frameworks and artworks themselves in order to 
understand and account for robotic art’s whimsical bodies within the new media 
cannon. What I could not cover within the narrower scope and purview of the 
thesis, however, is the relationship of robotic art’s whimsical ecology to interface 
design and computational languages. This presents potential for future research, as 
the field would benefit from an exploration of the complex and often inaccessible 
realm of computational languages in accounting for the mediation of a discourse 
between human and machine. In support of this project’s engagements with three 
key humanities and practice-based methodologies - new media theory, digital 
theory (especially in its attention to the affective experience of interfaces, as in 
gaming and play) and curatorial practice – my plan for expanding the project is to 
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look into the complex mediating structures of human-computer interaction in 
order to make them more accessible.
! A relatively recent turn in the humanities, towards the posthuman and 
nonhuman, has created a space for the reconsideration of objects. As frameworks 
like object oriented-ontology, new materialism and posthumanism have become 
more widely adopted, artists and makers have been among the first to experiment 
with objects in new ways in order to consider the possibility of attributing agency 
to them. While robotics and computational devices have not necessarily been the 
immediate entry point into these lines of thinking, I believe that the present 
theoretical paradigm change helps illuminate the enigmatic qualities and agentic 
capacities of such objects and the conceptualization of human machine 
engagement.
! As expressed earlier, my future research into ‘whimsical bodies’ will adopt 
three key methodologies in looking into the mediatory role of interfaces between 
humans and machines in order to explore different forms of user engagement and 
make the communicative processes of the computational domain more accessible. 
I also expect my research to engage with critical code studies and computer 
mediating language models such as those presenting through object-oriented 
programming (OOP), although my interest and knowledge of these fields are at a 
notably nascent stage. Thankfully, the constellation of the three methodologies 
mentioned also provide natural entry points to these much relevant fields, which I 
am now ready to focus on more directly. OOP will be one possible site for the 
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examination of how programming languages classify and modify data for 
facilitated interactions between human and machine.
! My future research will continue in the same vein in that it will consider 
human machine engagement following the writings of scholars such as: Mark 
Hansen (whose work, informed by the process-based-philosophy of Alfred North 
Whitehead, queries into the ways media shape and mediate our everyday lives), 
Caroline Langill (whose research into media art and curatorial practice proposes 
that there exists a lively quality to such work), Lev Manovich (who analyzes 
social computing through the ‘cultural form’ and lenses of digital media), Ana 
Munster (who explores the role of affect and corporeal experience as it relates to 
information aesthetics and sensory engagement), and Jussi Parikka (who traces 
the diverse histories/genealogies of media production and its effects, which can be 
related to the immaterial wasteland of computational software).
! This assemblage of media theory will allow for the expansion of my 
current thesis. I am interested in reframing the concept of whimsical bodies as a 
broader category or overarching metaphor that helps understand how certain 
computational communication languages – which are at times inaccessible and 
abstract for human interaction – get mediated and made affable, while also taking 
on a life of their own through the independent agency of machinic interfaces. In 
the wake of new media technologies, the technical languages of human-machine 
(as well as nonhuman-machine) interactions have become somewhat alienated and 
less accessible. My future research objectives will be to consider the affective 
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potential, nested in modes of experiencing, in whimsical bodies as they affect and 
are affected by their environments to make the hidden domain of computational 
ontologies more accessible to a human user.
! In gesturing towards potential lines of inquiry, I would like to reiterate my 
understanding of robotic art’s whimsical bodies as nonhuman entities that express 
and exert agency as well as signs of aliveness. I am interested in the proliferation 
of digital culture and inaccessibility of computer-based languages, which often 
become comprehensible only through mediating languages. Vis-à-vis the current 
divide between users and computers, I see it necessary to explore the development 
of accessibility platforms that will allow us to relate to computational beings. In 
developing new communication strategies and proposing a philosophical inquiry 
into the modes of being for computational entities, it is my aim to further develop 
the conversation and interaction between humans and machines. Through the 
initiation of curatorial methodologies for the reading and reception of computer-
based art - which I anticipate will be applicable to other environments of human 
machine interaction - the study of affective engagement and the consideration of 
nonhuman agency allows for a heightened awareness related to compatibility 
issues.
! The user and the designed machine interface must be compatible, 
generating a stimulating relationship that is mutually beneficial. This could 
possibly take the form of the user enjoying the act of play and the machine 
facilitating the appropriate programmed response from the user. Bruno Latour’s 
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actor-network-theory (ANT) supports such relational materiality. An influential 
case study through which to explore relationality in the digital realm has been the 
growing scholarly work on the affective experience of gaming interfaces. In the 
context of a video game, the signs of play observed are activated by a reciprocal 
interaction between machine and user. Associations, or reciprocal interactions, 
within networks form the actor’s definition and naming, and provide them with 
substance, action, intention, and subjectivity. Gaming offers a particularly exciting 
and engaging mode through which to study human-machine relations. One could 
also consider the experience of the game interface from the perspective of affect 
studies. Affect, according to Baruch Spinoza and his successors Henri Bergson, 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, is characterized by embodied experience that is 
realized through different emotional states. My own interests lie in Brian 
Massumi’s position on affect theory as he moves beyond this framing to further 
distinguish between affect and emotion. He characterizes the affective experience 
as a state of the body, yet expands this definition to say that affect is a pre-
emotional and precognitive bodily experience, which includes “micro-
perceptions” (Massumi, 2015). Micro-perceptions alter the body’s capacity to act. 
They do so by either enhancing or diminishing that capacity momentarily, resting 
between the individual’s perceptible and imperceptible experience of 
embodiment. Thus, the human machine interaction or connection generated by 
computer-based games is not emotional but rather lies in the precognitive 
instinctual realm of the human mind. The micro-perception, I believe, can act as a 
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point of departure to consider the experience of play, outside the anthropocentric 
paradigm for cognition based on human emotions, to consider the machine as 
having access to a kind of ontological and agentic capacity too.
! My continued research objectives will expand upon and continue to merge 
the realms of theory, curatorial practice and art in order to venture into an 
exploration of human machine interaction through the often-alienating processes 
of computational communication. Interdisciplinary crossings will occur in the 
examination of aesthetic and pragmatic interfaces, borrowing from my practice 
based research methods as an artist and curator. A potential example of such a 
crossing can manifest itself in a mediation of computer communication through 
the design of new OOP languages - outside of Perl and Ruby - that are based both 
on aesthetic experience and functional design. I feel that it will be beneficial to 
consider the order/flow of the communicative structures in OOPs and to curate 
them towards facilitated communication. Code can become an artistic playing 
field. I anticipate that this research will provide new frameworks for the 
philosophical understanding of digital interfaces to include nonhuman agencies 
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